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ABSTRACT 
Three Essays in Labor and Health Economics: Individual Decisions on Occupation, 
Labor Supply, and Demand for Health. (May 2004) 
Ja Eun Shin, B.S., Seoul National University; 
M.A., University of Rochester 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Qi Li 
 In this dissertation, I examine individual decisions in occupational choice, labor 
supply, and health care utilization. Occupational choice decisions of female college 
graduates on whether to teach or not are analyzed to understand the role of fertility and 
relative wages using a panel estimation method.  I also compare the behavioral changes 
in the labor force participation among teachers and nonteachers conditional on the 
presence of a new-born baby. 
 Using the human capital model where a worker decides her hours of work 
responding to wages, and her human capital is accumulated proportional to her hours of 
work, I predict that the positive relationship between entry wages and post wages. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the shock in entry wages may be attributed to post 
wage differentials. 
 I examine individuals’ choice of health insurance plan and utilization of health 
care services. Empirical evidence shows that there is favorable self-selection into health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) plans and that HMO members use more of office-
based and hospital outpatient services. It suggests ineffectiveness of HMO plans in 
reducing utilization. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
How individuals make decisions over choosing optimal solutions in various 
economic activities is the fundamental question in microeconomics. In Chapter II, I 
focus on individual decisions on occupation and labor supply. In particular, I examine 
the joint decisions of young female college graduates over their occupational choices 
and labor force participation. A young female would consider childbearing as well as 
relative wages as important factors in her decision making on whether to be in the labor 
force and which occupation she would work in. As the presence of a new-born baby 
possibly demands more hours at home for females, she would choose an occupation 
which allows her to manage childbearing and working at the same time. I consider the 
elementary and secondary school teacher as such an occupation and investigate the 
behaviors of teachers in response to the birth of a new child and the differences in wages, 
compared to non-teachers.   
In Chapter III, the relationships among wages, hours of work, and human capital 
accumulation are my primary interest. An individual as a worker receives wage offers 
and decides how many hours she would work given a wage offer to maximize her utility, 
considering the loss of utility from sacrificing leisure time for work. Provided that firms 
have only incomplete information on each worker’s productivity at the time of making 
wage offers, there might be some randomness in wages which, if positive, would be an 
additional incentive to workers to put more effort into working by increasing hours of                   
________________ 
 This dissertation follows the style and format of American Economic Review. 
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work. Hypothetically, more hours spent at work enhance workers’ productivity for the 
same reason that years of experience receive positive return in wages. I formulate these 
relationships in a simple human capital model and derive the reduced form wage 
determination equation for the empirical analysis. 
Chapter IV focuses on individual decisions on the choice of private health insurance 
plan and medical care consumption. Health status and health care services are relatively 
rarely examined consumption goods in microeconomics. As the standard of living 
improves and life expectancy is prolonged, demand for health care services to keep 
healthy and live long and associated medical expenditures become substantial economic 
problems for both individuals and policy makers.  
Demand for health care services emerges conditional on the naturally stochastic 
occurrence of health problems. Once needs for medical care exist, they are indispensable 
and expensive. Hence, it is not surprising that people are willing to purchase health 
insurance given their budget constraints and beliefs regarding the probability of having 
health problems. Every health insurance offers different arrangement of coverage and 
cost sharing. Given these differences across plans, an individual makes a decision over 
health insurance plan choice. Given the plan she has, she would decide how much health 
care service she would use upon the occurrence of a health problem.  
HMO plans are designed to contain the increase in health care expenditures using a 
tight utilization review and, in return, lowering cost sharing, which acts as a consumer 
incentive. The utilization review is seen as the device designed to prevent the possible 
unnecessary use of medical services resulting from the moral hazard behavior of insured 
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patients. However, it has been suspected that the success of HMO plans in reducing 
costs is in fact the result of the segmentation of population based on their health 
condition; expecting little future need for medical care, relatively healthy population are 
enrolled in HMO plans. As the previous literature provides only ambiguous conclusions 
and depends on narrow-scoped samples or outdated data, I test this hypothesis using 
recent data to find evidence expected to be relevant for policy reform. As noted in Ha T. 
Tu, Peter Kemper, and Holly J. Wong (1999), HMO enrollees have financial incentives 
for low cost sharing.   
Another empirical issue is the non-trivial number of zero observations for the 
dependent variables. I incorporate possible self-selection into the censored model of 
utilization and obtain the selection-free estimates of HMO effects.  
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CHAPTER II 
FERTILITY, RELATIVE WAGES, AND LABOR MARKET DECISIONS:  
A CASE OF FEMALE TEACHERS 
I.   Introduction 
The primary issue discussed in this paper is the relationship between fertility and 
relative earnings and labor market decisions by females. In the labor market, females 
make decisions about whether to participate in the labor force and which occupation they 
would work at. Occupation subgroups are categorized as teachers and nonteachers. The 
effects of fertility on labor force participation decision and occupational choice of 
females are then estimated using a binary dependent variable model of panel data with 
sample selection corrected. Comparison is made across occupations. 
A.   Literature Review and Significance 
The strong negative correlation between fertility and female labor supply has been 
well observed and examined since 1960’s (Randall J. Olsen, 1994). Many researchers 
found that with the presence of a new-born child, females are less likely to join in labor 
force1 (A. Maureen O’Brien and Clifford B. Hawley, 1986; Raquel Carrasco, 2001). 
However, much less attention has been paid to the effect of fertility on the occupational 
choices of female workers. One exception is Geraint Johnes (1999), who estimates the 
effect of fertility on joint decisions over participation, that is, hours worked (full-time or 
part-time) and occupation (knowledge work, others). With children under age 16, 
females prefer staying out of the labor force to working full time. This negative effect is 
larger if the full time occupation is related with knowledge. This suggests that there exist 
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systematic differences in labor market status, both labor force participation and 
occupation of a woman depending on her fertility status. Though Johnes (1999) tries to 
include occupational choices in his analysis of fertility effect, the category of occupation 
is broadly specified as knowledge (non-manual or skilled manual) work or others.  
I focus on the interaction of fertility with a specific occupation, teaching. The 
reason why teaching is of special interest in the analysis of the female labor force can be 
seen in the distinguishing characteristics of teachers in elementary and secondary 
schools. First, the dominant portion (68% in 1990; Eric Hanushek and Steven Rivkin, 
1997) of total employment in teaching is female. Historically, the teaching profession 
has been female-dominated.  
Fredrick Flyer and Sherwin Rosen (1997) show that teachers do not suffer from 
reentry wage loss2 after they spend time out of the labor force and then reenter. This 
supports the finding by Solomon W. Polachek (1981) that female-dominated occupations 
have lower human capital depreciation rates. Nursing is one of the occupations sharing 
similar characteristics with teaching. However, Flyer and Rosen do not find any 
significant result for nurses. Their finding provides one explanation why the teaching 
occupation is held mostly by females. Expecting to get married and have children, 
females would choose an occupation which imposes little penalty when they return to 
the job after their temporary leave needed for childbearing or other housekeeping 
burdens. In this sense, the teaching profession is more favorable to female workers than 
other occupations might be. However, this implication is not rigorously investigated in 
any of these studies.  
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Todd R. Stinebrickner (2002) gives evidence for the direct effect of fertility on 
attrition behaviors of teachers compared with nonteachers. From the duration analysis, 
he suggests that the single most important reason for females to leave the labor force is 
the presence of a new-born child, and this effect is larger if they are teachers. Peter 
Dolton and Gerald H. Makepeace (1993)3 provide further evidence for the relationship 
between fertility and teaching occupation in the bivariate binary framework. The number 
of children has a smaller negative effect on labor force participation among teachers4 
than among nonteachers. However, it only represents the indirect effect of fertility on the 
choice of occupation through the decision to participate in the labor force. Moreover, 
results from the switching model estimation, which Dolton and Makepeace (1993) 
support as more reasonable, are debatable. The reason is that the current occupation is 
observed only for those who participate in the labor force, so the observations for 
teachers not in the labor force and nonteachers not in the labor force are not available in 
the data.  
To avoid this identification problem from data limitation, I estimate participation 
and occupation equations using different samples, thus correcting possible selection bias. 
The occupation equation of whether or not to teach currently is estimated using the 
whole sample while the labor force participation decisions are allowed to be 
heterogeneous across occupational subgroups.5  Then, I aim to estimate the direct effect 
of fertility on occupational choice. The following questions are under investigation: 1. 
When a woman has a new-born child, how likely is she to be in the labor force? 2. 
Would she be working as a teacher?  3. Between teachers and nonteachers, how different 
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would the tendency for staying in the labor force be upon a new birth?  The previous 
literature, especially Flyer and Rosen (1997) and Stinebrickner (2002), consistently 
implies that the teaching profession is favorable for females allowing them to have 
temporary leave without cost, and in fact teachers behave like that. However, the exact 
direct effect of fertility on females’ occupation decisions remains unexamined.  
Contrary to these findings, one distinct characteristic of the teaching occupation 
makes the opposite predictions on the effect of fertility on labor force participation and 
occupational choice among females. A great deal of the literature on the issue of 
decreasing teacher quality finds that wages for teachers are low relative to alternative 
jobs. Thus, it is argued that to recruit and retain teachers of high quality, relative wages 
for teachers should be increased at a faster rate. With a new-born child who induces 
additional child care cost, either pecuniary or time, teachers might be more likely to keep 
working to compensate the cost than nonteachers, being forced to do this by low relative 
earnings. Hence, the presence of new-born baby has a positive effect on labor market 
participation by females and this effect is larger for female teachers than nonteachers. 
Motivated by the recent policy debate over expansion in educational expenditure in the 
U.S., whether wages for teachers are relatively low compared to nonteachers and what 
the role of relative wage for teachers in attracting females into the teaching profession is 
are studied.  
In general, it is believed that the teaching occupation has several advantages for 
females who have or expect to have children, such as location convenience, or regular 
holidays and vacation. With a new-born child, teachers can manage to keep working 
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more easily than it would be the case in other occupations. In addition, the presence of a 
new-born child is expected to make females more likely to choose the teaching 
occupation, which is the main focus of this study.  
There are several distinguishing features in this paper. First, I employ the panel 
estimation method. As been noted, panel analysis has advantages in controlling 
individual unobserved heterogeneous effects correlated with participation, occupation, 
and wages. Conventional sample selection problems emerge for two reasons: wages are 
observed only for labor market participants, and wages in nonteaching occupations are 
not observed for teachers. I manage these problems by applying the method in Jeffrey F. 
Wooldridge (1995), which is an extension of Heckman’s selection correction (James 
Heckman, 1979) to the panel data. Consequently, the panel estimation of wages does not 
suffer from any unobserved heterogeneity bias caused by females’ individual fixed 
effects and selection bias resulting from females’ labor market decisions. This is one 
major advantage of the panel approach over any cross-sectional analysis such as Dolton 
and Makepeace (1993).  
Using longitudinal information about occupation, I define teachers in two ways: 
those who have worked as teachers and those who are currently teaching at a given 
survey year. Over their lifetime, females can change their occupation for many reasons. 
There is no obligation or prior belief that once female become teachers, they will stay in 
the teaching profession thereafter. In the later period in their working life, they might 
enter the teaching profession after having stayed at home or had other occupations when 
young. Thus, they may appear as teachers in one year and as nonteachers in another year 
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over the survey years. With the first definition of teachers, the average characteristic 
comparison between teachers and nonteachers is documented. Using the second 
definition for ‘teachers’, fertility is interpreted as having a direct effect on current 
working status as teachers, not on whether teaching is the occupation a female has ever 
had.     
B.   Policy Implications 
To my knowledge, there is little investigation on the relationship between fertility 
and labor market behavior focusing on teacher-nonteacher comparison using U.S. data. 
Dolton is one of the major contributors to this literature, but he analyzes the U.K. case 
only. As in the U.K., there is an enormous amount of discussion and policy implications 
about teacher labor supply in the U.S. Education policy to reduce classroom size invokes 
a problem of teacher supply shortage. With job opportunities for women getting broader, 
the problem of luring high quality female workers away from teaching draws attention.6 
As a starting point for solutions to these issues, this paper attempts to understand the 
labor market behaviors of females across occupations, namely, teaching and non-
teaching.   
This paper provides evidence for the effects of fertility and relative wages on 
participation and occupational choice by females and differences across occupations. 
First, there exists a negative selection bias in nonteachers' wages caused by occupational 
decisions. In terms of wages, nonteachers are worse off than average female college 
educated workers. Second, the presence of a new-born child aged under 2 has only 
insignificant and sign-changing marginal effects on working as teachers in a given 
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survey year. The effect of a new birth on labor participation decisions is negative and 
significant. This marginal effect substantially differs between teachers and nonteachers. 
For teachers, it is significantly negative and larger. There findings suggest that the 
fertility factor does not directly affect occupational decisions, but has significant but 
different effects on labor force participation decisions across occupations. The fertility 
condition is found to be an important factor in labor force participation decisions among 
females, in particular, female teachers. 
The relative wage incentive to attract more teachers seems to work. In the pooled 
sample estimation, teachers’ wage relative to nonteachers’ shows significant and positive 
effect on the choice to work as teachers.7 Even the larger marginal effect of relative 
wages on occupational choice is found in the switching participation model.   
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section II describes the estimation 
models and the panel data sample selection correction method. Section III summarizes 
the data. Section IV discusses the estimation results. Section V concludes the chapter.  
II.   Estimation Method 
The primary model is a binary probit estimation model of two limited dependent 
variables, which are labor force participation and occupation choice. The model can be 
written as: 
(1.1)        uYYFWT nt +−++= )ln(ln* βαδ ,                       
(1.2)               νφφγ +++= )(* 21 YLFZP ,      
(1.3)                       tttt XY εϕµ ++=ln ,   
and     
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(1.4)                        nnnn XY εϕµ ++=ln ,    
  
where T* and P* are latent decision variables of being a teacher and of participating in 
the labor force, respectively. T=1 is observed if T*>0 and P=1 is observed when P*>0. 
 indicates the log hourly wage for an occupation j=t (teaching), n (nonteaching). jYln µ  
denotes an unobserved heterogeneity assumed to be constant within an individual. Labor 
force participation decision depends on last year wages, L(Y). W, Z, and Xj , j=t,n denote 
the explanatory variables including demographic conditions, education, regional labor 
market conditions, and family factors. The key explanatory variables are the fertility 
variable, F, and relative log wages across occupations, ln  – ln  . I measure the 
fertility factor as the presence of a new-born baby under age 2.  
tY nY
 I use a three-step procedure to estimate the model. In the first step (Procedure 1), 
I derive and estimate the reduced form participation and occupation equations by 
inserting   and ln  into T*. From the estimates of the reduced form equations, the 
selection correction terms are obtained. The second step (Procedure 2) is to include these 
additional terms in estimating log wage for each occupation and obtain the predicted 
values for them. Finally, the structural form equations of T* and P* are estimated with 
the predicted relative log wages derived from the second step (Procedure 3). The first 
two steps are analogous to Robert J. Willis and Rosen (1979) and Heckman (1979), but 
both studies are limited to the cross-sectional analysis. Wooldridge (1995) suggests a 
simple and practical application of the above procedure to the panel data with a selection 
problem. I employ Wooldridge’s method in Procedures 1 and 2 to obtain selection 
tYln nY
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correction terms for selectivity free wage regressions in panel data. Procedure 3 is 
implemented using a panel probit estimation.  
For correcting the possible self-selection, the procedure by Wooldridge (1995) is 
implemented in the case of a binary latent selection equation and a main equation in the 
panel data analysis. The estimation steps are well illustrated in Francis Vella (1998) and 
Badi Baltagi (2001).  
Define a latent dependent variable, h*it as ititit Xh εδ +=*  . A dummy variable sit takes 
a value of 1 if h*it>0. The main equation is log wage equation given as:  
itititit uXY ++= ϕµln . 
Step 1. For each period t=1, 2,…,T, estimate the binary selection equation Pr(s=1|X) 
as a standard probit model. From it, obtain the selection correction term as an inverse 
Mill’s ratio, 
)ˆ(
)ˆ(ˆ
δ
δφλ
X
X
it Φ= , t=1,…,T for sit = 1.  
Step 2. Then including this additional term, estimate the following wage equation,  
ititititit uXY +++= λγϕµ ˆln  
by the fixed effects method. This method will eliminate itµ , producing the consistent 
estimate of ϕ  safe from biases due to both selection and unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. After Step 1 and Step 2, Procedure 3 as mentioned above is applied to 
complete the estimation.   
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I have two selection equations, T* and P*, and two wage equations, ln  and 
. In the pooled model, I repeat Step 1 for each probit equation and repeat Step 2 for 
each wage regression to obtain selection bias corrected relative log wages for the 
structural form probit estimations of T* and P*. To allow heterogeneity of labor market 
participation behavior across occupations, a switching model is tried. The occupational 
decision equation among labor force participants is given as follows:  
tY
nYln
(1.5)    T uYYFW nt +−++= )ln(ln* βαδ                 
where T=1 if T*>0 and >0, while T=0 if T*<0 and >0. The labor force 
participation equations are written separately by occupation groups:   
*tP *nP
(1.6)         ttt YLFZP νφφγ +++= )(* 21 , 
and    
(1.7)        ZP nnn YLF νφφγ +++= )(* 21 ,   
where P=1 if >0 (for teachers), and P=1 if >0 (for nonteachers), respectively. 
Note that the participation decision P*j is observed only when occupation j is chosen. It 
is noted that in the longitudinal analysis, the occupation group is not defined as clearly 
as in the cross sectional analysis, because females may change their occupations over 
their lifetime. Thus, it is too restrictive to define ‘teachers’ as those who are teacher once 
and for all. Instead, I consider the teachers’ group in two ways; one is by occupation 
history, that is, those who have ever worked in the teaching profession at any point of 
their lifetime. The demographic comparison is made based on this categorization. The 
second way is to define ‘teachers’ based on current occupations. In estimating Equations 
*tP *nP
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(1.1) and (1.5), the occupation choice is measured as the current occupational status of 
labor force participants in a given year. For estimating the switching labor force 
participation Equations (1.6) and (1.7), a female’s status in the labor force is considered 
within each occupation group.8 Specifically, for each occupation group, the participation 
decisions are regarded as unobservable if the alternative occupation is chosen.9 In this 
way, I compare the response of labor market participation decision and occupation 
choice to the fertility factor and relative wages between two occupation subgroups. 
III.   Data 
I used the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women. Several criterions were 
used to limit the sample for the estimations. To obtain a balanced panel,10 I only 
included the sample interviewed in every wave during 1968-1988. There are two reasons 
why I limited the waves up to 1988. Though survey data is available up to 2001, the key 
variables regarding fertility, education, occupation and wages were dropped or changed 
substantially since 1991.11  Since the prime age for childbearing among females is their 
20’s and 30’s, the survey years of 1968-1988 cover most of the information about the 
respondents during their prime fertility ages from 21 to 44. In 1988, the youngest is aged 
31 and the oldest is aged 47. Since the focus of this paper is the effect of fertility 
conditions on the labor supply behaviors of young women, the limited sample period 
seems not to cause a serious problem.  
The final sample includes only females with at least 16 years of schooling (or 
equivalently with college or higher education) completed by 1988.  Overall, among 
5,159 females aged 13-26 interviewed in 1968, 2,712 are interviewed continuously 
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TABLE 1--DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
 
Time-Varying   
Age Age of the Respondent in the Survey Year 
Education Highest Grade Completed by the Survey Year 
Married Marital Status Dummy =1 if Married 
LFP (Labor Force 
Participation) 
Employment Status Dummy=1 if Participate in the Labor Force 
Job Occupation Dummy =1 if Current/Last Job is Teaching and in the Labor 
Force 
Husband Income Husband Income (Wage/Salary/Business/Farm/Professional Practice) 
Baby Dummy for the Presence of a New-Born Child Aged under 2 
Residence Dummy for Residence in South =1 if in South 
Unemployment Rate Unemployment Rate in the Region of Residence, 0-10 Integer Scale 
Time-Invariant  
White Race Dummy=1 if White 
Maxedu Highest Grade Completed by 1988 
Mother’s Education Highest Grade Completed by the Respondent’s Mother in 1968 
Mother’s Occupation Dummy for Mother’s Occupation =1  if Mother Has Ever Been a Teacher 
Teach Dummy for Teaching Experience =1 if Job=1 at Least Once During 
Survey Years 
until 1988. When the education criterion is applied, 605 remain in my sample.12 Among 
them, 306 have teaching experience and 299 do not. The definition of each variable is 
documented in Table 1.  
The summary statistics in Table 2 show the differences in characteristics between 
teachers and nonteachers.13  If a female has teaching experience, she is slightly older and 
more educated on average, though the difference is much less than a year.  A teacher is 
under slightly stronger pressure from family commitments, such as marriage and fertility, 
and enjoys higher husband income, compared to a nonteacher counterpart. Then, the 
lower participation rate for those who have teaching experience is not surprising.  
Teachers have a stronger correlation with their mothers’ occupation being teaching. 
Mothers of teachers attain less education than mothers of nonteachers.  
 
 
  16 
TABLE 2--SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Sample Have Been Teachers Have Never Been 
Teachers 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age              Overall 
                     Between  
                     Within  
32.53 5.56 
3.69 
4.72 
32.00 5.38 
3.72 
4.50 
Education   16.73 .85 
.87 
0 
16.53 .77 
.83 
0 
Married    .78 .41 
.38 
.24 
.62 .49 
.42 
.28 
White      .86 .35 
.37 
0 
.85 .35 
.36 
0 
Presence of a New-Born 
Baby under Age 2 
.13 .34 
.13 
.31 
.12 .32 
.13 
.29 
Labor  Force Participation .77 .42 
.28 
.32 
.84 .37 
.27 
.25 
Mother’s Job=Teaching .10 .30 
.31 
0 
.06 .24 
.24 
0 
Mother’s Education in 1968    12.17 2.85 
2.84 
0 
12.65 2.96 
2.86 
0 
Husband Income       6.86 4.60 
3.84 
3.05 
5.52 4.99 
4.15 
3.18 
Number of Individuals (n) 306 299 
 
As reported in Appendix (Table A1, Panel A), teachers are relatively more 
educated even after graduating from college (37.25% of them have 18 years of schooling, 
implying they have Master’s degree). About 57% of females with no teaching 
experience are college educated only. Panel B in Table A1 reports that teaching 
experience is highly correlated with a specific college major. Half of teachers receive 
their Bachelors degree in Education. This tendency does not appear for nonteachers. It 
indicates that among teachers, college major choice seems to be a predetermining signal  
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TABLE 3--AVERAGE EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION  
aThe sample includes only females currently participating in the labor force.  
 Have Been Teachers Have Never  
Been Teachers 
Current Occupation 
Log(Wage)  Currently 
Teaching 
Currently Not 
Teaching 
Currently  
Not Teaching 
Teaching Not 
Teaching 
Mean   
Std. Dev. 
       Overall  
       Between  
       Within 
6.28 
 
(.89) 
(.67) 
(.65) 
6.22 
 
(.88) 
(.83) 
(.55) 
6.35 
 
(.89) 
(.75) 
(.59) 
6.43 
 
(.91) 
(.67) 
(.72) 
6.22 
 
(.88) 
(.83) 
(.55) 
6.41 
 
(.91) 
(.71) 
(.69) 
N 1561 934 625 1559 934 2177 
n 292 244 180 273 244 453 
  bEarnings are measured as log hourly rate of pay in the current/last job. The annual average      
   Consumer Price Index of All items (seasonally adjusted) released by the Federal Reserve Bank at St.    
   Louis is used to normalize hourly rate of pay (Base year=1982~1984 as 100). 
 
for their future occupation after graduation. As a whole, the simple comparison in 
characteristics suggests that teachers are different labor force group from nonteachers, 
especially in terms of their education attainments and college major. 
Table 3 compares the average real wage across occupations. The real wage is 
higher for the nonteaching profession. If a female with teaching experience chooses 
teaching as her current job, her average earnings are lower than for those who have 
teaching experience and are not teaching currently. The question is why a female who 
can make a choice between teaching and nonteaching jobs would choose to be a teacher 
when she receives a lower wage. This can be explained by the ‘comparative advantage.’ 
Females who are certified to be teachers are teaching currently because in a nonteaching 
job, they can not be as competent as those who never teach because of the required skills 
in a nonteaching job. Though teachers are more educated, most of their schooling is 
concentrated on the field of education only, hence it does not result in high productivity  
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TABLE 4--FAMILY BACKGROUND BY PARTICIPATION AND OCCUPATION CHOICE 
(PANEL A) THE PRESENCE OF A NEW-BORN BABY UNDER AGE 2 
  Current/Last  Job Total 
Labor Force  Not Teach    Teach  
Out 
 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
.276          .331 
.448          .471 
.293 
.455 
In  
 
.085          .075 
.278          .263 
.082 
.274 
Total  .122          .128 
.327          .334 
.124 
.329 
 
(PANEL B) THE PRESENCE OF A NEW-BORN BABY UNDER AGE 2 
  Have Ever Been Teachers Total 
Labor Force  No           Yes  
Out 
 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
.289          .293 
.454          .455 
.291 
.455 
In  
 
.082          .082 
.274          .274 
.082 
.274 
Total  .115          .131 
.320          .338 
.124 
.330 
 
(PANEL C) MARITAL STATUS (1 IF MARRIED, 0 OTHERWISE) 
  Current/Last  Job Total 
Labor Force  Not Teach    Teach  
Out 
 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
.946          .985 
.226          .121 
.985 
.200 
In  
 
.610          .722 
.488          .448 
.642 
.479 
Total  .676          .777 
.468          .417 
.705 
.456 
 
(PANEL D) HUSBAND INCOME (AMONG MARRIED FEMALES) 
  Current/Last  Job Total 
Labor Force  Not Teach    Teach  
Out 
 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
8.96          8.59 
3.36          3.38 
8.84 
3.37 
In  
 
8.97          8.58 
3.03          3.19 
8.85 
3.09 
Total  8.97          8.58 
3.12          3.24 
8.85 
3.17 
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TABLE 4--CONTINUED 
(PANEL E) LABOR MARKET STATUS AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN TEACHERS 
  Current/Last  Job  
Labor Force Not Teach Teach Total 
Out 
 
71.94 
35.42 
28.06 
18.51 
100.00 
28.19 
In 51.49 
64.58 
48.51 
81.49 
100.00 
71.81 
Total 100.00 
57.25 
100.00 
42.75 
100.00 
100.00 
N 3264 2437 5701 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and high wage in a nonteaching job. Once certified as teachers, the teaching profession 
is where they can achieve their best. Table 4 documents characteristics of teachers in 
their family commitments and labor market status compared to nonteachers. The detailed 
statistics are reported on the extent to which females are bound to family commitments 
in three panels. In Panel A, if a female is currently out of the labor force and her last 
occupation is teaching, then there is 33.1% chance that she has a new-born baby 
currently, whereas this probability is only 27.6% if she has worked as a nonteacher.  If 
she is in the labor force as a teacher, she has less chance to have a new birth than when 
she works as a nonteacher.  This observation is also valid in Panel B, when I compare 
the chance of having a new baby among those with teaching experience and those 
without. Though there is no difference across occupation groups in the chance of having 
a new birth while in the labor force, females with teaching experience are more likely to 
have a new-birth than those without when they stay out of the labor force. In general, 
when a new-born baby is in the household, teachers are more likely to stay out of labor 
force than nonteachers. It is consistent with the findings of Stinebrickner (2002). If 
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females hold a teaching job, their propensity to participate in the labor force is very 
sensitive to the new birth. Similar results are found for the number of children.  
As shown in Table 4 (Panels C, D, and E), if the current/last occupation is teaching 
in any survey year, then regardless of the labor force participation status, a female in the 
teachers’ group is more likely to be married and her husband will earn less than a 
nonteacher’ husband. This is an interesting observation because as shown in Table 1, 
when ‘teachers’ are defined as have teaching experience, husband income is on average 
higher for teachers than for nonteachers. Combined with Panel D in Table 4, this 
suggests that females with teaching experience actually work as teachers when husband 
incomes are lower.  
In view of family commitments, a teacher (previously or currently) is more devoted 
to family ties; if she has a new birth, she stays out of the labor force. As regards 
supporting the family financially, with low husband income, females choose the teaching 
profession for secure employment status and maintenance of a baby.  
The last panel in Table 4 presents the joint decisions regarding participation and 
occupation among females with teaching experience. When their (last) occupation is 
nonteaching, the current participation rate is only 64.6% while it is as high as 81.5% 
when they have taught (in their last employment). If they are currently out of the labor 
force, more than 70% of them were not teachers in the previous job. This suggests a 
strong connection between teaching occupation and labor force participation.   
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IV.   Estimation Results 
A.   Wage Equations and Selection Problem 
Table 5 shows the fixed effects estimation of the earnings Equations (1.3) and (1.4).  The 
first (second) column of Table 5 reports the result for those who are working as teachers 
(nonteachers) in the labor force in the current year. The first thing to notice is the 
difference in age effect.  The linear effect of age is significant for both occupation 
groups but much larger for nonteachers. The negative effect of the quadratic term of age 
is significantly negative and much larger in magnitude for nonteachers. Figure 1 
illustrates the predicted log wage-age profiles of both groups. The wage profile of  
teachers is quadratic in age but much flatter compared to that of nonteachers. 
Nonteachers show the diminishing marginal effect of age on log wage, which is 
consistent with Flyer and Rosen (1997). Teachers start with higher initial wages but 
wages rise at a constant rate. Relative to teachers, nonteachers start their career with 
lower initial wages but benefit from a higher rate of growth during age 25~43. During 
their 20’s and 30’s, nonteachers earn more than teachers. Due to the decreasing rate of 
wage growth among nonteachers after age 43, teachers overtake nonteachers in terms of 
log wages. This may be related to wage rigidity for teachers resulting from the 
government regulation, or it may result from the fact that the teaching profession is not 
as sensitive to how experienced teachers are or how well they catch up with technology 
advances in the workplace. Other occupations are quick to adapt to new technology, so  
during the younger age when workers are quick to learn new skills, they benefit from 
wage gain as they become more experienced. On the contrary, teachers, who are in the 
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FIGURE 1.  AGE-EARNING PROFILES BY OCCUPATION 
 
TABLE 5--SELECTION CORRECTION FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION OF WAGES 
Variable Teachers 
Equation (1.3) 
Nonteachers 
Equation (1.4) 
Constant      .479            (.337)        -1.752***     (.340)    
Age       .215***      (.021)            .358***      (.022)   
Age2    -.0012***      (.0003)         -.0033***     (.0003)  
Married      .032            (.037)           -.013           (.034)    
Region of Residence      .075            (.048)         -.128**       (.050)    
Unemployment Rate      .013            (.009)       .0096           (.010)   
Lamda (Participation)    -.113**        (.051)          -.017            (.061)    
Lamda (Occupation)      .063            (.053)           -.117**        (.050)    
R2       Within 
                Between 
           Overall 
0.914 
0.689 
0.716 
0.828 
0.441 
0.561 
F 776.61 735.22 
N (n) 731  (211) 1449  (370) 
Fraction of Variance 
Contributed by Fixed Effects 
.865 .799 
F (No Fixed Individual Effect) 11.56 9.00 
              a*, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.  
                                bStandard deviations are in parenthesis.  
              cThe dependent variable for teachers (nonteachers) is log hourly wage in any survey year 
when a female is in the labor force working as an elementary or secondary teacher (working at 
nonteaching occupations).        
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first place more adept at doing their job, do not acquire many new skills. Thus, getting 
more experience does not benefit much when young. However, when old, workers are 
not as good as they were at learning new skills and tend to stay behind in catching up 
with technology advances prevalent in the overall economy. Consequently, the fast 
increasing wage gain from experience is diminished for nonteachers while teachers do 
not suffer from it because their skill becomes outdated at a relatively slow rate. For this 
reason, teachers earn more than nonteachers over age 43. In brief, teachers earning 
profile is much flatter than nonteachers earning profile, implying their heterogeneity in 
the labor market. 
Selection bias from participation is negative for both occupations but significant 
only for teachers. Selectivity from occupational decisions is positively insignificant for 
teachers while statistically significant, and negative selection bias is found for 
nonteachers. This implies that teachers are selected among worse–than-average among 
all females through their participation choice. Nonteachers are below average among all 
females in the labor force. When the selection correction is implemented separately for 
teachers and nonteachers,14 as shown in Table 6, the negative selection bias in 
participation among teachers becomes insignificant. On the other hand, the positive 
selection in occupational choice for teachers is found significant and negative selection 
in occupational choice for nonteachers is larger than in Table 5. This confirms that 
nonteachers are negatively selected into nonteaching occupations among all female 
college graduates in the labor force. Collecting selectivity bias in wages is important in 
revealing the uncontaminated effect of relative wages on occupational choice. 
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TABLE 6--SELECTION CORRECTION FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION OF WAGES 
     IN THE SWITCHING LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION MODEL 
Variable Teachers 
Equation (1.3) 
Nonteachers 
Equation (1.4) 
Constant     .246          (.385)         -1.82***      (.348)   
Age      .223***    (.024)          .359***      (.021)    
Age2    .0014***    (.0004)       -.0033***      (.0003)    
Married     .020          (.055)         -.018            (.034)    
Region of Residence     .210***    (.056)         -.130**        (.052)    
Unemployment Rate     .022*        (.011)        .009            (.010)    
Lamda (Participation)    -.020         (.0.36)        -.048            (.061)     
Lamda (Occupation)     .104*        (.059)       -.141***      (.050)    
R2       Within 
                Between 
           Overall 
0.926 
0.656 
0.711 
0.835 
0.467 
0.562 
F 559.92 726.71 
N (n)           502 (183)           1385 (373) 
Fraction of Variance Contributed 
by Fixed Effect 
.883 .745 
F (No Fixed Individual Effect) 12.72 9.51 
       aIn the switching model, at each survey year, participation bias correction in log hourly wages  
             is corrected for the unobserved wages in case of teaching in last job but not in the labor force    
             currently (for teachers’ wage), and of not teaching last year but not in the labor force this year (for  
             nonteachers’ wages.) 
 
B.   Fertility, College Major and Occupational Choice 
Tables 7 and 8 document the results from the probit estimation of occupation 
decision Equations (1.1) and (1.5), respectively. Since this is a nonlinear estimation 
method, the conventional marginal effect interpretation of coefficients is inappropriate. 
Hence, I report the marginal effect of each explanatory variable on the predicted 
probability of being teachers in the second column. Among significant variables, age has 
a negative impact while education has a positive impact. The presence of a new-born 
baby seems not to have any effect on occupation choice, though it is negative. The 
largest marginal effect on the probability of being teachers comes from college major. 
Education major influences to the strongest extent a female to be a teacher. With other 
college majors such as business, social science, and health/medical science, she is highly  
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TABLE 7--PROBIT ESTIMATION OF OCCUPATION CHOICE DECISIONS 
Variable Equation (1.1) Marginal Effect 
Constant   -17.17***      (2.04)   
Age     -.050***      (.014)      -.008***     (.002) 
Education      1.03***      (.121)        .156***     (.012) 
Married      .257*          (.140)         .037*         (.013)   
White      .184            (.201)        .026           (.025)  
Baby     -.201           (.192)       -.027           (.013)   
Region of Residence      .173            (.218)         .026           (.017)    
Mother’s Occupation in 1968    -.427*          (.260)       -.051**       (.066)     
College Major=Education     1.53***      (.186)        .318***     (.033)   
College Major=Business    -1.95***      (.429)       -.103***      (.013)  
College Major=Social Science    -1.20***      (.201)      -.114***      (.013)    
College Major=Health, Medical 
Science 
   -2.36**        (1.03)      -.086***      (.011)    
Relative Log Wages     1.74**        (.783)     .265**        (.080) 
N (n) 2345 (513)  
Log-Likelihood    -784.00   
Variance of Fixed Effects     2.45           (.112)       
Fraction of Variance Contributed 
by Fixed Effects (=Rho) 
    .857           (.014)       
LR Test (H0: Rho=0) 1046.45  
 
TABLE 8--PROBIT ESTIMATION OF OCCUPATION CHOICE DECISIONS IN  
         THE SWITCHING LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION MODEL 
Variable Equation (1.5) Marginal Effect 
Constant   -13.88***    (2.73)   
Age     -.040**      (.019)       -.008**      (.004) 
Education      .817***    (.154)         .168***    (.034) 
Married      .275          (.307)         .049          (.049)   
White      .191          (.408)         .036          (.068)  
Baby      .157          (.229)         .035          (.054)   
Region of Residence      .061          (.447)         .013          (.092)    
Mother’s Occupation in 1968      .213          (.297)         .048          (.073)     
College Major=Education      1.41***     (.239)        .355***    (.064)   
College Major=Business    -1.88***     (.628)       -.139***     (.028)    
College Major=Social Science    -1.24***     (.298)       -.161***     (.034)    
College Major=Health, Medical 
Science 
   -3.22**       (1.63)       -.129***     (.026)    
Relative Log Wages     2.71**       (1.13)     .558**       (.242) 
N (n) 1413 (467)  
Log-Likelihood   -546.93  
Variance of Fixed Effects     2.43         (.206)         
Fraction of Variance Contributed 
by Fixed Effects (=Rho) 
    .855         (.021)         
LR Test (H0: Rho=0) 583.92  
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    TABLE 9--PROBIT ESTIMATION OF LABOR PARTICIPATION DECISIONS 
Variable         Equation (1.2)      Marginal Effect 
Constant      -.141          (1.17)   
Age      -.009          (.010)     -.0008         (.001)  
Years of Schooling       .121*        (.072)       .011*       (.006)    
Married      -.920***    (.188)      -.067***   (.014)   
White      -.737***    (.199)     -.043***   (.009)    
Baby      -1.04***    (.099)       -.173***   (.027)   
Husband Income      .0087         (.016)     .0008        (.001)     
Mother’s Education in 1968      -.013          (.021)     -.0011        (.002)    
Region of Residence       .023          (.109)       .002        (.010)   
Unemployment Rate     -.0022         (.024)     -.0002        (.002)    
Last Year Log Hourly Wage        .254***   (.055)       .022        (.006) 
N (n) 3135 (557)  
Log-Likelihood -855.98  
Variance of Fixed Effects       .802         (.082)  
Fraction of Variance Contributed 
by Fixed Effects (=Rho) 
      .392        (.032)       
LR Test (H0: Rho=0) 85.69  
 
likely to be in nonteaching occupations. This suggests that whether to be teachers or not 
is a decision made during college years, not after graduation. Females in college have  
expectations of their future occupation and choose a field of study as a preparation for  
their desired occupation after graduation.  
C.   Fertility and Participation Decision 
In Table 9, the education level shows positive significant effect on participation 
probability. If a female is married and white, she is less likely to be in the labor force.  
More education provides better qualifications and more opportunity in the labor 
market,attracting females to join the labor force. By contrast, marriage plays a 
discouraging role for females in participating in the labor market. Husband income is not 
a factor significantly affecting labor force participation decisions among wives.  Among 
all other explanatory factors, the largest negative significant marginal effect on 
participation is found in the presence of a new-born child, -0.173. This result is precisely  
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   TABLE 10--PROBIT ESTIMATION OF LABOR PARTICIPATION: TEACHERS 
Variable Equation (1.6) Marginal Effect 
Constant    -1.10            (2.16)     
Age    -.031            (.024)      -.0034           (.002) 
Years of Schooling     .158            (.140)         .015            (.017) 
Married    -1.28***      (.404)       -.076***      (.025) 
White    -.802**        (.346)       -.050***      (.019) 
Baby    -1.16***      (.188)      -.212***      (.054) 
Husband Income     .023            (.027)         .002            (.002) 
Mother’s Education In 1968     .004            (.041)      .0003            (.004) 
Region of Residence     .130            (.202)         .012            (.019) 
Unemployment Rate     .021            (.046)         .002            (.004) 
Last Year Log Hourly Wage     .410***      (.135)     .038***      (.014) 
N (n) 916 (244 )  
Log-Likelihood -261.59  
Variance of Fixed Effects      .908          (.182)  
Fraction of Variance Contributed 
by Fixed Effects (=Rho) 
     .452          (.061)  
LR Test (H0: Rho=0) 23.22  
 
 
compatible with the description of Olsen (1994). Like marital status, fertility condition is 
influential in decisions on labor force participation among females. 
Teachers retain many different characteristics from nonteachers in terms of labor 
market status and family commitment factors. When allowing them to behave 
heterogeneously in decisions regarding participation as shown in Tables 10 and 11, all 
significant and negative effects from marital status (married) and racial type (white) are 
larger for teachers. The significant and negative effect of the presence of a new-born 
baby is twice as large for teachers relative to nonteachers. For both teachers and 
nonteachers, family commitments such as marriage and childbearing retract them from 
the labor force. The finding that teachers are more sensitive in adjusting their labor 
market status according to their fertility condition is consistent with the discussion in 
Table 4: teachers have a stronger tendency to be out of the labor force if they have a new 
birth.  
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TABLE 11--PROBIT ESTIMATION OF LABOR PARTICIPATION: NONTEACHERS 
Variable Equation (1.7) Marginal Effect 
Constant       .085          (1.51)    
Age      -.017         (.013)        -.001          (.001)  
Years of Schooling       .124         (.093)         .008          (.006)  
Married      -.878***   (.251)        -.054***    (.016) 
White      -.611**     (.252)        -.029***    (.009) 
Baby      -.951***   (.127)        -.125***    (.030) 
Husband Income      -.004 .       (.022)       -.0003          (.001)   
Mother’s Education in 1968      -.025         (.026)         -.002          (.002)  
Region of Residence       .111         (.142)          .008          (.010)   
Unemployment Rate     -.0003        (.030)    -.00002          (.002)  
Last Year Log Hourly Wage    .271***   (.074)      .018***    (.006) 
Log-Likelihood -546.54  
Variance of Fixed Effects       .870         (.112)       
Fraction of Variance Contributed 
by Fixed Effects (=Rho) 
      .431         (.063)       
LR Test (H0: Rho=0) 57.16  
 
In conclusion, the negative effects of fertility on participation decisions are found 
to be apparent in my investigation of the female labor supply. This effect varies across 
occupations and is stronger for teachers. Marital status puts some limitation on females, 
in particular teachers, to participate in the labor force, but to a lesser extent than the  
presence of a baby.  Upon a new birth, teachers are more likely to be out of the labor 
force than nonteachers would be. This implies that little wage loss for temporary absence 
and the slow skill obsolescence hypotheses explain the tendency of teachers to take time 
off from the job upon the presence of a new-born baby and associated nurturing 
responsibilities. Without such flexibility in leave-and-reenter options, nonteachers would 
be less likely to take time off when they expect to have babies (that is, when they are 
married) and adhere to the job. However, staying out of labor force is a preferred option 
for nonteachers when they have a child. In this decision making, husband income is 
unlikely to matter.    
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 D.   Relative Wage Effects on Occupational Choice  
The effect of relative wage on occupational choice is widely discussed and is also 
one of the most interesting issues in this analysis because of its implication for policy 
making regarding education expenditures. In Table 6, relative log wages have the second 
largest15 positive and significant effect. With a slight increase in wages relative to other 
occupations, the teaching occupation is apparently attractive to female college graduates. 
This tendency is even stronger in Table 7.   
This suggests that the wage incentive to attract more teachers is effective. The 
recent dramatic increase in educational expenditure aims mostly to raise teacher salaries 
and eventually to attract more and better teachers. The cross-sectional results by Johnes 
(1999) and Dolton and Makepeace (1993) imply similar results. Even after controlling 
individual fixed effects along with selection correction in wages, there remains a smaller 
in size but still significantly large (0.558 in the switching model) effect. Females’ 
response to the increase in relative wages is found to be less than what has been usually 
found in the previous literature. Hence any education policy aimed at improving the 
teacher supply with better wages needs more careful assessment of its effectiveness. 
Alternative policy emphasizing how to lead female high school graduating or college 
student into education majors may be more effective since college major is very 
important in their after graduation choice of occupation as teachers.16    
V.   Conclusion 
In this paper, using panel data for young females, I investigate the relationship 
between fertility and relative wages and their participation and occupation decisions. 
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Several conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, the presence of a new-born baby 
seems not affect the occupational decisions of whether to work as a teacher or not. The 
fertility condition strongly affects their labor force participation. This effect varies across 
occupations, and is larger for teachers. Upon a new birth, teachers are more likely to 
drop out of the labor force but this does not relate to their decision to work as teachers at 
a given time period. Once they decide to join the labor force, females’ choice of the 
teaching profession is not correlated with their childbearing.  
Second, the direct effect of relative wages on occupational choice has been studied. 
There is strong evidence that higher relative wages for teachers provide a proper 
incentive for females to be teaching. This result supports the effectiveness of the recent 
policy of increasing teacher salary in order to improve teacher quantity. Age-earning 
profiles are found to be considerably different between teachers (linear) and nonteachers 
(quadratic). The comparisons across occupations suggest that teachers and nonteachers 
are heterogeneous in their labor market decisions and earning determinations. The 
importance of correcting for selection biases properly has also been established.  
Other than relative wages, college major is a most important factor in occupational 
decisions among female college graduates. Therefore, further analysis of the choice of 
college majors and its relationship with post-graduation occupational choice will be 
useful to understand what determines supply and quality of teachers and what is the best 
way to invest educational expenditures to provide more and better teachers for the next 
generation. 
 
  31 
CHAPTER III 
HUMAN CAPITAL, ENTRY WAGE, AND POST WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
I.   Introduction 
One of the most robust findings in labor economics is a positive return on time spent 
in the labor market investigated in the standard log wage equations. Among various 
attempts to explain this relationship, the primary model is the general human capital 
theory, in which the stock of human capital rises with experience in the labor market. 
There are two main streams to describe how people accumulate their human capital 
through working. First, Yoram Ben-Porath (1967) and many followers (Jacob Mincer, 
1974; Gary Becker, 1975) suggest that people invest in general human capital at the 
expense of time or direct pecuniary cost, resulting initially in lower wages and 
subsequently in higher wages in later periods of working life. This so-called ‘On the Job 
Training’ (OJT) theory of post-schooling human capital investment and wage growth 
predicts that at the individual level, there will be a negative relationship between the 
initial wage level and wage growth. At the market level, it also predicts that the present 
values of the investor’s lifetime wage (with lower initial wage and faster growth) and of 
the otherwise equivalent noninvestor’s lifetime wage (with higher initial wage but 
slower growth thereafter) equals one. There two predictions are tested to be valid in the 
empirical study of David Neumark and Paul Taubman (1995).   
The other hypothesis regarding the general human capital accumulation process, 
namely ‘Learning by Doing’ (LBD) theory, holds that people enhance their productivity 
by learning skills through work without giving up working hours or wages. In the two-
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period model (Ricardo D. Cossa, James Heckman, and Lance Lochner, 1999), workers 
choose optimal consumption and leisure (in hours) to maximize their present value 
lifetime utility. This gives different predictions from the OJT and the LBD human 
capital evolution processes on the relationships among initial wage level, hours worked, 
and wage growth over time. In the OJT, people reduce hours worked for post-schooling 
training and receive lower wages initially. Over time, their wages grow faster. Therefore, 
their wages and hours worked move in opposite directions over time. People who invest 
on human capital earn lower initial wages and experience higher growth in their future 
wages. The gap in the initial wages would be compensated by difference in wage growth 
rates. As age approaches the overtaking point, two wage profiles (one flatter than the 
other) may converge to each other (Mincer, 1974).  
By contrast, in the LBD process, there is no explicit cost for human capital 
accumulation. Given wage offers, people choose how many hours to work and by 
working, they enhance their productivity. As wages reflect increases in their stock of 
human capital, wages increase over time as well, and this increase will be larger for 
workers who spend more hours at work. Since people adjust their labor supply 
(measured in hours) responding to wages, the patterns of wage and hours worked would 
move in parallel with each other; the higher the wages, the more hours they work. 
Moreover, assuming no costly training and flexible choice in hours worked, a difference 
in initial wages may cause different choices of hours worked, and so, different amount of 
accumulated human capital. Eventually, the small gap in initial wages is transmitted to a 
huge wage differential in the later working years.  
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Empirical evidence such as Neumark and Taubman (1995) has limitations for 
verifying that their findings indeed prove the OJT hypothesis because they have not 
considered the endogenous training participation decisions of workers explicitly. When 
they find a negative relationship between wage level and wage growth, it is simply 
argued to be evidence for the OJT. The separate identification and reconciliation 
between the OJT and LBD models are little examined.  
Aiming to provide evidence for the LBD model, my study considers the initial wage 
effect on post wage differentials. Variation in initial wages is derived from two factors; a 
worker-specific permanent factor and random transitory components. The fact that 
people with higher initial wages earn more later than their counterparts with lower initial 
wages may be attributed to the possibility that people with higher initial wages are 
smarter (endowed with more human capital). Then, differences in post entry wages are 
consequences in their difference in innate ability before working. If the growth rate of 
human capital accumulation does (not) depend on individual endowed or prior-to-
working ability, the gap in initial wages will remain as the same extent (increase in the 
magnitude) in future wages without any slope effect (with positive slope effect). This 
implies that the permanent components of initial wages are mostly responsible for future 
wage differentials.  
By decomposing entry level wages into their permanent and transitory components 
(Michael Baker, 1997), the relative accountability of these two components for post 
wage differentials can be investigated. It is expected that the determination of entry 
wage is quite different from that of later wages because when a firm decides to hire 
  34 
someone who enters the market for the first time, the firm usually does not have enough 
information to accurately judge the productivity of the individual. Therefore, there is 
more randomness in assigning an initial wage compared with later wages. I define that 
an individual is lucky if he obtains a relatively high wage (relative to others who have 
similar productivity). Whether this initial luck can motivate the individual to work 
harder thereafter (say, in order to keep a well-paid job) in his career and this 
consequently leads to a persistent future high wage is examined in this paper.  
In sum, there are two possible ways in which entry level wages may influence future 
wage: 1. higher initial wages increase hours worked and 2. higher initial wages cause 
faster wage growth (slope effect).  Whether any of these effects is attributed to a 
permanent factor or to random shock (luck) in the entry level wages is the last question I 
try to answer.   
This paper focuses on the slope effect of entry wages on future wages. It is found 
that the entry-level wage is indeed an important factor in determining future wages both 
in the theoretical framework and in the empirical studies. In the LBD framework of 
human capital accumulation, an individual worker is endowed with innate ability. She 
adjusts labor supply decisions on hours worked responding to her initial wage. With the 
LBD, she accumulates her productivity proportional to hours worked. If the level of the 
starting wage is high, she works for more hours in the next period. This leads her to 
obtain more human capital during working. Her future wage is likely to be high, directly 
reflecting her enhanced productivity.   
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Using a simple regression model, I estimate the effects of entry-level wage and its 
random component with data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 79. The 
main finding is that the entry-level wage has a positive effect on future wages and that it 
persists over time. This effect is found to be attributable to the random component of the 
initial wages, not the component based on observed factors for an individual. This 
supports the positive relationship between wage level and wage growth predicted by the 
LBD model.  
II.   Theoretical Framework 
Let a representative worker endowed with innate ability α0, which is not fully 
observed by firms. I assume that once a worker is actually employed, then her ability 
becomes public information both to her employer and to the firm that she works for. A 
worker accumulates her human capital through her working experience in the LBD 
process. The wage paid by the firm to this representative worker is, on the average, equal 
to the observed output of a worker. The observed output can be decomposed into two 
parts: worker’s productivity, and a random component due to the firm’s inability to 
observe the individual’s true ability before hiring her.  
Then, wages at time t are determined by the firm’s expectation about the marginal 
product of a worker, , plus a random noise εt:  etα
(2.1)                   .     t
e
ttw εα +=
I let expected the marginal product of a worker at t be the marginal product of the 
worker at the end of t-1:  
(2.2)           .       1−= tet αα
  36 
 Following a typical labor supply model, I let a worker adjust her working hours, ht, 
responding to her wage as follows:  
(2.3)              ( ) tttt hwhh βεαβ +=−+= − 010 . 
Equation (2.3) says that working hours (or effort input at work) is positively 
correlated with the difference between the wage and the marginal productivity (β >0) If 
a worker enjoys positive random shock in her productivity at work, she will invest more 
time on working in response to higher wage than her actual human capital. 
Similar to the LBD human capital theory (Cossa, Heckman, and Lochner, 1999), my 
benchmark model of the accumulation process of a worker's ability depends on working 
hours as follows: 
(2.4)                  11 −− += ttt hηραα .        
If ρ =1, then Equation (2.4) implies that the accumulation of human capital is never 
depreciated. Then through a lifetime, the productivity of a worker keeps increasing. η  
measures the rate of learning from the last period working. 
Simple deduction from Equations (2.3) and (2.4) leads me to:  
(2.5)                         ∑−
=
−−− ++−
−+=
1
1
1
0
1
00 1
1 t
j
j
jtt
t
t
t h ερηβεηβρηρ
ραρα .                  
The first term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of (2.5) is the initial human capital of 
the worker. It is constructed from time-invariant characteristics such as years of 
schooling, sex, and race. The second term at the RHS of (2.5) is a time-varying 
component of the obtained productivity from experience in the workplace. It includes 
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working experience and tenure with a specific employer. The third term,  ε0 ,  is a random 
component of the initial wage, which is my main concern.  
To predict the sign and trend of the initial wage effect, I consider four cases where 
different distributional assumptions on the random component of initial wages and 
variation from the benchmark process of human capital accumulation are considered. In 
particular,  
Case 1.  ρ = 1, and {εt} is i.i.d. with mean zero and finite variance  for t=1,…,T, 
ε0  can have a much larger variation than . The human capital accumulation process 
follows Equation (2.4). Random shock in initial wage reflects the luck of an individual. 
With 
σ 2
σ 2
ρ = 1, Equation (2.5) becomes 
(2.6)             .                                       ∑−
=
+++=
1
1
000
t
j
jt ht εηβηβεηαα
I find that the initial random shock in wages has a permanent and positive impact on 
future human capital for all future time periods. This marginal effect is constant )(ηβ for 
all t. 
In this case, I can interpret the error component in the initial wage as the quality of 
matching between a worker and an employer (or a workplace environment). In general, 
each worker only has limited access to information about job openings. A worker could 
afford to search and gather employment opportunity information only when she manages 
to be employed during the searching process or support herself while unemployed. So 
her matching with a job would occur at a time when she can not afford the searching 
process any more and she would choose a job from the offers available to her then. At 
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any moment, it is not practically possible that a worker searches the best match using the 
entire information about the job market.  
In the other case where a worker does not try to change her employer, her workplace 
environment with the same employer can still change randomly in the sense that many 
economy-wide factors that a worker is unable to control may affect her working 
environment relevant to her productivity.  In either case, it is reasonable to assume that 
the matching quality is random (has a random component) over time.  
Case 2. 0< ρ < 1, i.e. tα  follows a stationary AR (1) process,  
(2.7)                  101 −− ++= ttt h ηβεηραα  where 0 1<< ρ .       
Equation (2.7) allows the possibility of human capital depreciation over time. It is 
reasonable that as they get older, workers may forget part of their knowledge 
accumulated in the past. If they switch jobs and work in different tasks, part of the 
specific human capital obtained in previous jobs may be lost in their productivity in the 
next period. In either case, workers’ human capital may depreciate for a given time 
period. Direct deduction from Equation (2.7) leads to: 
(2.8)        ∑−
=
−−− ++−
−+=
1
1
1
0
1
00 1
1 t
j
j
jtt
t
t
t h ερηβεηβρηρ
ραρα . 
The effect (coefficient) of initial shock, , is positive but monotonically 
decreasing over time. Eventually, it dies out to zero. Initial wage differentials caused by 
uneven random luck among workers will not have a persistent significant effect on 
future wage differentials. 
1−tηβρ
Case 3. ρ = 1, and {εt} is a stationary AR (1) process, i.e. 
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(2.9)                       ttt u+= −1δεε  where  0 1<< δ .         
I assume that the human capital accumulation process is Equation (2.4) with ρ =1. 
Equation (2.9) indicates that any kind of random luck in the labor market of an 
individual worker is correlated over time. Once a worker gets lucky, she is more likely to 
remain lucky in the next period while an unlucky worker is more likely to suffer from 
her continuous unluckiness in her later working career. I may consider random luck as 
some unobserved individual heteroskedastic characteristic that helps a worker get a high-
paying job or give a good signal to employers. Either directly or indirectly, these factors 
enable a worker to maintain her luck with employers and keep high wages over time. 
Since these factors are likely to be related with a worker’s personality and attitude 
towards relationships, work, and risk, they produce a positive correlation with luck over 
time. 
To figure out the effect of temporally correlated random shock on future wages, I 
combine Equations (2.4) and (2.9) to obtain the following:          
(2.10)            ∑∑−
= =
−+



−
−++=
1
1 1
000 1
1 t
j
j
s
s
sj
t
t uht δηβεδ
δηβηβαα .               
The initial shock produces a positive effect on future productivity and wage. This effect 
monotonically increases over time with an upper bound of 


−δηβ 1
1 . Due to the 
positive and persistent impact of initial luck on future productivity and wages, given that  
other factors are fixed, the wage differential between lucky workers and unlucky 
workers in the first period at work does not disappear. This implies that the wage  
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FIGURE 2.  CHANGES IN ENTRY WAGE EFFECTS (CASE 4) 
 
differential among experienced workers is a consequence of the variation of initial luck 
they receive when starting to work. 
Case 4. Both {
              Years Since Starting Work 
tα } and {εt} are stationary AR (1) processes. As my most general 
case, I combine human capital accumulation that allows for partial depreciation and an 
intertemporal corr tion within random luck in wages, i.e., ela tα  follows Equation (2.7) 
and  εt  follows Equation (2.9). Then it follows that:         
(2.11)             ∑∑−
= =
−
−+



−
−+−
−+=
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1 1
1
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t
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δηβρεδρ
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ραρα .     
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Now, the marginal effect of initial shock on future wages, 



−
−
δρ
δρηβ
tt  depends on 
two AR (1) parameters, ρ  and δ . Assuming that both ρ  and δ are positive numbers 
between 0 and 1, regardless of the relative magnitude of the two parameters, the effect of 
initial wage will eventually disappear. However, a converging trend of this effect 
depends on the specific choices of two parameters. In particular, if ρ =δ , then the effect 
of initial wage will be ( )1−ttρηβ .  
Figure 2 illustrates changes in the initial random shock effect over time. Depending 
on different choices of ρ  and δ , the marginal effect follows different patterns in trends. 
Even in cases of increasing trend, the trend is reversed to decrease at t>6. Intuitively, the 
reasonable conjecture is that the intertemporal correlation of a worker’s productivity is 
stronger than that of her random shock in wages, say ρ >δ . Figure 3 shows the trend of 
initial shock when ρ =δ . If ρ is very close to 1, the marginal effect first explodes and 
then slowly decreases towards zero. As ρ  gets smaller toward zero, the exploding trend 
stabilizes and the initial shock effect converges to zero within a relatively short period of 
time. Figures 2 and 3 show that changes in the marginal effect of initial shock are not 
necessarily monotonic. In Case 4, though the marginal effect of initial wages reduces to 
zero eventually, it does not monotonically decrease and the speed of convergence 
depends on the values of ρ  and δ . Hence, during the early period of a working career, 
workers with positive initial shock might gain larger and larger benefits from it over 
certain time. Along with longer experience at work, it starts to decrease and eventually 
leaves no effect. 
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III.   Empirical Model 
Using Equations (2.2) and (2.6), I can rewrite a wage function of Equation (2.1) 
according to four possible cases:  
(2.12)   Case 1. tt htw νηβεηα ++−+= 000 )1(  where ∑−
=
+=
2
1
t
j
tjt εεηβν ,           
(2.13)   Case 2.  t
t
t
t
t hw νεηβρηρ
ραρ ++−
−+= −
−
−
0
2
0
1
0
1
1
1   
where t
t
j
j
jt
t εερηβν += ∑−
=
−−2
1
1 ,  
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For the empirical analysis, I use two different wage equation specifications to find 
out which cases more faithfully reflect the data generating process (i.e. the true effect of 
initial wages). Given a time period t, for each individual i, I consider two log wage 
regressions. 
     (Regression 1)        ttt Xww νδγ ++= 10 , 
and 
     (Regression 2)     ttt Xw νδεγαγ +++= 20100 . 
X  includes several demographic and labor force characteristics of a worker, for example, 
age, years of schooling, sex, race, marital status, years of experience, and AFQT score. 
In Regression 2, since both initial ability ( 0α ) and random shock are unobserved, I need 
the first-step estimation of the initial wage equation given as: 
(2.16)          0000 εδ += Zw , 
where Z needs to contain additional variables not contained in X to avoid 
multicollinearity in Regression 2. Thus, I approximate 0α  based on observables Z. In 
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Regression 2, I decompose the initial wage effects into a systematic part and a random 
shock (luck) part separately. I let Z satisfy the exclusion condition by including some 
explanatory variables in Z which are excluded in X, such as education squared, an 
interaction term of education and AFQT score. Also, some family variables such as 
father’s educational attainment, mother’s educational attainment, the closest sibling’s 
gender, and educational attainment are used as additional explanatory variables 
responsible for the determination of initial wage. In particular, I try to control innate 
ability using these family related variables.  
Using obtained initial wages and residuals from Equation (2.16) as 
, Regression 2 is estimated as follows:  00000 ˆˆˆˆ εεδ +≡+= wZw
(2.17)      w ttt Xw νδεγγ +++= 2010 ˆˆ0 .                     
 In Regression 1, I obtain a preliminary measure of initial effects. Then, whether 
the source of these effects is systematic or random components of the initial wage is 
investigated in Regression 2. The questions I pursue are whether there exists an effect of 
initial wage on future wage, how persistent is this effect over time, and what are the 
effects and trends in its persistence as a random component of the initial wage on future 
wages. 
IV.   Data 
For the empirical analysis described above, I employ the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 79. My sample includes only a cross-sectional sample of 6,111 
individuals aged 14-21 as of December 31, 1978. Based on the information about 
employment status over survey years 1979-2000, I track down when they started to work  
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TABLE 12--ENTRY WAGE EFFECTS 
Years Since 
Initial Work  
Coefficient of Entry 
Wage (t-Ratio) 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
No. Obs. 
 
Adjusted R2 
1     .460     (12.21) .0377 541 .386 
2     .504     (12.88) .0391 521 .412 
3     .393     (7.42) .0529 506 .244 
4     .237     (4.62) .0512 498 .235 
5     .318     (6.38) .0498 487 .301 
6     .418     (7.92) .0524 498 .317 
7     .247     (5.11) .0485 514 .297 
8     .226     (4.12) .0548 514 .261 
9     .332     (4.82) .0688 501 .191 
10     .270     (4.64) .0581 508 .230 
11     .219     (4.55) .0482 516 .326 
12     .308     (5.76) .0535 500 .344 
13     .296     (3.89) .0760 487 .223 
14     .228     (3.28) .0694 492 .252 
15      .210     (3.71) .0565 501 .268 
17     .308     (5.34) .0578 529 .251 
19     .251     (4.33) .0579 507 .282 
21     .245     (3.35) .0732 447 .200 
 
and years of experience. Then, I limit the time periods for each individual to only after 
all schooling is completed, leaving the number of cross-sectional observations at 752.17 
Then initial wages are defined as the first wage observed after years of education 
completed stop increasing. This allows me to exclude cases where people start work 
during schooling or return to school after they start working. For each year during 1980-
2000, the current wage, my dependent variable, is the wage observed after 1 to 21 years 
later from the year of starting to work for each worker. For example, if the number of 
years since starting to work is equal to 3, the current wages are wages in 1982 for people 
who started to work in 1979, or wages in 1985 for those started to work in 1982, and so 
on. All wages are converted to the wages for compatibility using the Consumer Price 
Index. The distributions of years of starting work both overall and within a fixed number 
of years since the starting year are reported in Table A2.  
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V.   Estimation Results 
I implement a simple OLS estimation to find out which theoretical cases described 
above are indeed consistent with the data. Results are presented in Tables 12 and 13.  
Table 12 reports the results of Regression 1 where I estimate the effect of initial wages 
on future wages without decomposing initial wages. It is noteworthy that the effect of 
initial wage is persistent even after 20 years since workers started to work. On average, 
one percentage increase in initial wages raises all future wages by 0.28%. In this 
specification, I am unable to differentiate the effect of explained components of initial 
wage from that of random shock in initial wages.   
Before I interpret this result as a true effect of initial wage, I pay attention to the 
possibility of an endogeneity problem. An endogeneity problem happens if any 
individual unobserved characteristic makes workers relatively more productive and 
raises both their initial wage and future wages. Innate ability is the common suspect 
considered responsible for this endogeneity bias. My data provide a proxy variable for 
individual innate ability, AFQT scores measure in quantiles. By controlling AFQT 
scores explicitly, I try to avoid the possibility that the observed persistence of effects of 
initial wage over time reflects the persistent feature of workers’ unobserved ability. Also, 
some information about family members is included, assuming that these variables may 
be correlated with an individual’s unobserved ability. NLSY79 provides father’s and 
mother’s educational attainment reported in 1979, and the closest sibling’s gender and 
years of schooling reported in 1993. Combining these variables in different ways, I 
decompose initial wages into systemically predicted part and unobserved random (luck)  
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TABLE 13--DECOMPOSITION OF ENTRY WAGE EFFECTS: SPECIFICATION I 
Years Since 
Initial Work 
Coefficient of 
(t-Ratio) 0wˆ
 
Std. Dev. 
Coefficient of 
0εˆ (t-Ratio) 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Adjusted R2 
1  1.222   (2.81)*** .4343  .455   (12.04) .0377 .388 
2   .861    (1.99)** .0392  .501   (12.77) .0393 .411 
3  1.559   (2.73)*** .5701  .386   (7.29) .0529 .249 
4   .502    (0.83) .6043  .235   (4.57) .0514 .234 
5   .482    (0.81) .5953  .316   (6.32) .0501 .300 
6   .129    (0.22)    .5966  .417   (7.92) .0526 .316 
7 - .029   (-0.05) .6295  .249   (5.12) .0487 .296 
8 - .469   (-0.71) .6562  .233   (4.22) .0552 .261 
9 - .328   (-0.39) .8342  .339   (4.88) .0695 .191 
10   .086   (0.10)   .8447  .271   (4.64) .0584 .228 
11   .064   (0.11) .5689  .221   (4.55) .0485 .325 
12   .121   (0.17) .7266  .309   (5.76) .0537 .342 
13   .452   (0.49)  .9135  .294   (3.84) .0766 .221 
14 - .405   (-0.47) .8561  .233   (3.34) .0698 .251 
15   .731   (1.02) .7183  .207   (3.64) .0567 .267 
17 - .543   (-0.77)   .7058  .316   (5.44) .0581 .252 
19 - .862   (-1.32) .6528  .255   (4.41) .0578 .285 
21   .152   (0.17) .8738  .246   (3.35) .0734 .198 
Average .151  .279   
      aThe predicted initial wages and residuals are estimated using age, education, education 
squared, AFQT score, an interaction term of education and AFQT score, race, sex, and marital 
status as explanatory variables.  
     bDependent variable: logarithm of real current wages for all years of experience, 1 to 18. 
     cAll estimated coefficients for 0εˆ are significant at 1% level. I omit *** for concision. 
     dIn the first step regression of initial wage, I include age, gender (dummy), marital status 
          (dummy), race (dummy), education,  education squared, AFQT score, an interaction term of  
           education and AFQT score, and dummies for ‘year of starting work’.  
 
 
part. Table 13 presents the results of the initial wage decomposition. The systematic part 
of initial wage has a large and highly significant effect on future wages during the first 3 
years since the year of starting to work. Afterwards, the effect becomes insignificant.  
By contrast, the unexplained random component of initial wages (Table 13, Column 
3) is consistently positive and highly significant in its impact on future wage up to the 
most recent data available (year 2000). There is a slight fluctuation in the extent of the 
effect across time periods. The average effect of one percentage increase in initial wages 
is a 0.274% increase in future wages up to 21 years after having started work. This result  
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FIGURE 4.  ESTIMATED ENTRY WAGE EFFECTS 
 
provides supporting evidence for my theoretical hypothesis, which held that the positive 
random shock (luck) in initial wage increases future wages permanently through a 
worker’s human capital accumulation (via working harder). Figure 4 plots the estimates 
of initial random component effects. Certainly, there are fluctuations in magnitude over 
time. For the first 3 years, the coefficients are remarkable higher than for the later years. 
Whatever the causal relationship between initial wages and post wages may be, it is 
reasonable to assume that initial wages should have a strong relationship with post 
wages over a short time period. Over a 3-9 year period, the effect of initial random 
shocks fluctuates across years with a slightly decreasing trend. Over time, the extent of 
the fluctuation in the initial random shock effect stabilizes. After 10 years, it settles  
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down to around 0.25, not likely to converge to zero.18 
It is important to integrate my empirical results with one of the theoretical 
predictions. As shown in Figure 3, the effect of random shock as part of initial wages is  
decreasing during only a short period time and it does not disappear toward zero even 21 
years later. This supports the prediction of Case 1 where I assume the i.i.d. random 
shocks and no human capital depreciation. Given that my sample only contains relatively 
young workers (aged 14 to 21 in 1979, and aged 35 to 56 in 2000), no human capital 
depreciation assumption seems not a restrictive assumption. My empirical results 
support the proposition that if a worker’s luck in job matching and in her performance at 
work is purely random unrelated with any other direct factors which determine her 
productivity at a given time, it functions as an incentive for her to spend more time in 
working and to invest more effort in work. This leads to a permanent increase in her 
human capital level. Therefore, after over 20 years later, her post wages benefit from the 
good luck in her initial wage.   
An interesting explanation of wage differential within groups is provided. Given the 
same innate ability, educational attainment and other demographic conditions, workers 
benefit or suffer from wage inequality, which is caused by differences in their initial luck 
at work. Once lucky, she is more likely to remain lucky in wages only because she gets 
lucky in the beginning. Once unlucky, it is difficult to overtake her lucky counterpart. 
Hence, I observe a persistent wage differential, and this will not be eliminated simply by 
equalizing systematic determinants of wages across workers. 
 
  50 
VI.   Conclusion 
The standard Mincer wage regression developed by Mincer (1974) and its various 
successors do not explicitly explain what are unobserved factors in wage determination 
and what causes wage differentials across individuals. Among all possible unobserved 
factors, I examine the role of initial wage in understanding the determination of future 
wages.  
I present a human capital accumulation model showing the theoretical predictions of 
initial wage effects on future wages.  I estimate the future wage equation as a function of 
initial wage which is decomposed as a systemically explained part and an unexplained 
random part. My finding is consistent with the model assuming that luck is random and 
independent over time and that there is no human capital depreciation (for relatively 
young workers). Then a positive constant effect from initial luck is predicted and 
supported by the estimation results. 
This suggests that the level of entry wage, specifically its random luck portion rather 
than the actual productivity portion related to observables, provides an additional 
incentive for workers to invest more effort at work and maintain their wages high 
throughout their working life.  
Some issues call for further research. One may argue that the random component of 
initial wage may be related to an individual’s ability not observed by economists but 
(partially) observed by firms who made a hiring. If this is true, then the initial wage 
effects may reflect unobserved individual heterogeneity rather than luck. To address this 
concern, one needs some instrumental variables that are (i) correlated with the initial 
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wage, (ii) not correlated with an individual’s future wage, and (iii) not perfectly 
correlated with the X variables used in Regressions 1 and 2. These three conditions are 
difficult to satisfy simultaneously. The NLSY data provides only an individual’s parents’ 
education, siblings’ education and siblings’ gender, which can be considered legitimate 
instruments that satisfy (ii) and (iii). However, these variables have poor explanatory 
power for individual’s initial wage. Regression of entry wages on these variables gives 
an adjusted R2 of 0.021. Thus, (i) is violated. In fact the only variables that are 
(relatively strongly) correlated with initial wages are an individual’s own AFQT score, 
education, and sex, but all these variables are part of the X variable and therefore cannot 
be used as instruments. Information about family members such as siblings’ initial 
wages and their AFQT score may serve as good candidates for legitimate instruments. 
However, the NLSY data does not contain this information. I am left with a `weak’ 
instrumental variable problem. Unless I encounter some `strong’ instruments correlated 
with innate ability but not part of the X variable (own IQ score and education level), any 
attempt to rely on instruments fails to properly control unobserved ability in initial 
wages. Given that it is unlikely that firms can observe all individuals’ heterogeneity 
(ability), it seems fair to say that the random components of initial wage is at least 
partially attributable to luck. Further research is needed to examine exactly what 
percentage of the initial wage can be attributable to luck.  
Another question is what exactly this luck in initial wage means. Obviously, 
educational attainment, experience, and other well-accepted determinants of wages do 
not explain it. It can be a matching quality in job searching or at work. It can be an 
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economic-wide factor such as an unbalanced technology advance favoring some 
subgroup of workers. It may represent the signaling about how good a worker is, which 
is perceived by her first employer. In the sense that initial wage is an outcome of both 
the observed and unobserved productivity of a worker, the random component of initial 
wage, which I call ‘luck,’ can be used as an alternative proxy variable for unobserved 
ability. However, more investigation is necessary to verify which is responsible for the 
persistent impact of initial luck on post wages. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HMO PLANS, SELF-SELECTION, AND  
UTILIZATION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
I.   Introduction 
Since the HMO Act was passed in 1973, HMOs (Health Maintenance Organizations) 
have become one of the most popular types of managed care plans. Faced with a 
dramatic increase in health care costs, HMOs implement utilization reviews, a tight 
authorization process, and a restricted choice of providers as means of managing 
utilization and quality.  
A.   Trends and Relevance 
During the last two decades, the number of HMO enrollees has proliferated from 9.1 
millions (4% of total population) in 1980 to 76.1 millions (26.4% of total population) in 
2001 (Source: Health, United States 2003). Between 1977 and 2001, the percentage of 
the U.S population under age 65 that joined private insurance HMOs increased 
dramatically from 3.7 to 27.9 percent (Table 14).  
Over the same period, national health expenditures per capita increased from $1,067 
to $5,035, and total national health expenditures as percent of GDP rise from 8.8% to 
14.1%. Out of total national health expenditures, the share of private expenditure 
decreased from 57.3% to 54.6%.  
Motivated by relatively slow growth in private health care expenditures and the 
prevalence of HMOs in the private insurance market, I investigate the effect of HMO  
enrollment on the utilization of two types of health care services: office-based visits and  
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TABLE 14--TRENDS IN PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: HMO ENROLLMENT 1977-2001  
(UNDER AGE 65) 
 1977 1987 1998 2001 
Percentage with Private Insurance 79.4 77.7 72.3 71.5 
Percentage with Private Health Insurance HMO 3.7 17.1 30.5 27.9 
 (Source: Health, United States, 2003; Amy K. Taylor, Karen M. Beauregard and Jessica P.   
       Vistnes, 1995) 
 
hospital outpatient visits to answer the question of policy effectiveness: Do HMOs 
succeed in limiting medical service utilizations relative to other insurance arrangements? 
One complication in this analysis is the endogeneity in health plan choice decisions. The 
hypothesis regarding self-selection is examined: the utilization reduction effect of HMOs 
observed in many studies may be a consequence of the selective enrollment of a 
healthier population in HMO plans, not of the more efficient medical care delivery 
management of HMOs. To address the issues of non-negativity and high frequency of 
zero observations for the dependent variables, I employ the censored regression model of 
utilization.  
B.   Literature Review 
Some studies have shown that HMOs are associated with lower hospitalization rates, 
shorter inpatient hospital days, and the same or more office visits (Sherry Glied, 2000; 
Robert Miller and Harold Luft, 1994; David M. Cutler and Richard J. Zechhauser, 2000). 
However, no conclusive evidence is provided on the hypothesis that HMOs effectively 
reduce the utilization of health care services. In regard to physician outpatient visits, a 
comprehensive review is provided in Miller and Luft (1994). They report that among 14 
observations from 10 studies, seven show lower physician service use (of which 3 results 
are statistically significant) while seven find higher use (of which five were statistically 
  55 
significant). With recent data, 9 of 10 observations document either higher or little 
difference in HMO plan office visits compared with conventional indemnity (or fee-for-
service) plans. There is no evidence that compared to the behavior of indemnity plan 
members, substantially lower hospital use by HMO enrollees is accompanied by 
substantially higher use of physician services.  
The dramatic changes in form among different managed care plans during the 
1990’s can be one reason for these seemingly unsettled conclusions. In addition, a 
statistical reason is discussed by Janet Hunt-McCool, B. F. Kiker, and Ying Chu Ng 
(1994), who show that the sign and significance of the effects of HMOs on physician 
office visits and hospital inpatient care are sensitive to a choice of parametric 
specifications on the functional form of utilization. This sensitivity may be attributed to 
the ignorance of two data characteristics of observed health care utilization: (1) it is 
always non-negative, and (2) it contains a high frequency of zero events.  
Another statistical aspect that brings ambiguity into the empirical literature is the 
endogeneity problem of health plan choice decisions jointly determined with utilization 
decisions (A. Colin Cameron, Pravin K. Trivedi, Frank Milne, and John Piggott, 1988; 
Donna Gilleskie, 1998). Evidence on self-selection in health plan choice varies across 
studies depending on data choice, definition of selection, and estimation specification. In 
most cases, the analysis is focused on the role of demographic, economic, and health 
related factors in determining health plan choice. Bryan Dowd, Roger Feldman, Steven 
Cassou, and Michael Finch (1991) find that selectivity bias is small and insignificant. 
Similarly, Taylor, Beauregard, and Vistens (1995) suggest that HMO enrollees are 
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younger but not much healthier than those in fee-for-service (FFS) plans, implying that 
self-selection based on health condition is not a major factor in the cost savings by HMO 
plans. On the other hand, Marilyn Jackson-Beeck and John H. Kleinman (1983) 
document that among FFS members, those who are younger and use less health care 
services switch into HMOs. Joan Buchanan and Shan Cretin (1986) report that younger 
populations and families with lower income and lower annual medical expenditure prior 
to switching into HMO plan select HMOs. Evidence presented in Hunt-McCool, Kiker, 
and Ng (1994) is mixed: positive selection bias on hospital inpatient care, but negative 
bias on physician office visits. To avoid selection bias from a nonrandom sample, some 
studies (Willard G. Manning, Joseph P. Newhouse, Naihua Duan, Emmett B. Keeler, 
and Arleen Leibowitz, 1987; James Ligon, 1993; Ligon 1994) use experimental data of 
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. However, the obsolescence of this experiment 
and the continuously changing health care system leave findings in these studies with 
little relevance. 
Since it is not obvious that health plan choice is independent of the decision on 
health care utilization, it is important to explicitly address the issue of self-selection in 
any empirical research on health care service utilization. Tu, Kemper, and Wong (1999) 
acknowledge the possible selectivity bias. Michelle Mello, Sally Stearns, and Edward 
Norton (2002) explicitly consider the issue of self-selection and find a substantial 
selection bias in effects of health insurance choice on utilization. By contrast, Dowd, 
Feldman, Cassou, and Finch (1991) find contradictory evidence that selectivity bias is 
neither large nor statistically significant.  
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Various estimation methods are employed to overcome the limitation of previous 
studies and to achieve joint estimation of plan choice and utilization, at the same time 
respecting the unique data characteristics for observed utilizations (Dowd, Feldman, 
Cassou, and Finch, 1991; Donald S. Kennel and Joseph V. Terza, 2001; Partha Deb and 
Trivedi, 2002). Due to its computational intensity to practice, each method is used as an 
exemplary application without any general consent on its implementation. 
C.   New Contribution 
Acknowledging enormous variation in data, estimation methods, and results in the 
literature about selection and utilization performance of HMOs, I attempt to correctly 
evaluate the effects of HMO plans on the utilizations of different sites of medical 
services. First, my study uses recently released, nationally representative data, the 
Medical Expenditures Panel Survey 2000. Combined, the household component and 
medical condition component provide comprehensive information about individuals’ 
health-related condition and utilizations across various service sites as well as usual 
demographic and socioeconomic status. Subjective evaluation on the quality of health 
care gives me a way to understand the quality management of HMOs. Few of the 
previous studies use a nationally representative sample. The most recent one used in 
those studies, the National Medical Expenditure Survey, was collected in 1987. As the 
structure and enrollment of HMOs changed considerably over last decades, information 
revealed from recent data may have meaningful policy implications in health care reform 
debates. 
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Secondly, I explicitly deal with the problem of a non-trivial number of zero 
observations using the censored-at-zero MLE model. When ignored, a misspecification 
problem is a concern since the dependent variable with excessively many zeros may not 
follow a normal distribution as assumed. To preserve the efficient handling of 
estimations, I employ a censored MLE model, treating zero values as a consequence of 
the censoring-at-zero. At the same time, I control the possible bias from endogenous 
health plan choice decisions using the relatively simple method of correction of Vella 
(1993).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the 
econometric model where utilization of health care services is determined conditional on 
the endogenous choice of insurance plan. Details of econometric implementation 
incorporating self-selection and non-trivial number of zero values for the dependent 
variables are described. Section III describes the data. The empirical results are 
presented in Section IV. Section V concludes with comments and suggestions for further 
research. 
II.   Econometric Model 
I model the non-negativity and non-trivial number of zero observations for the 
dependent variables within the framework of the censored-at-zero regression. Let Y  
denote the value of the latent variable underlying the observed values of utilization, Y . 
The utilization equation is formulated as:  
*i
i
(3.1)                 Y iiii uHMOX ++= δβ* ,                                            
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where  indicates exogenous variables, either continuous or discrete. HMOi  is a binary 
variable that I allow to be endogenous. The censoring takes the form of , 
that is,  
iX
*},0max{ ii YY =
(3.2)        Y  if Y  or equivalently u*ii Y= 0* >i }{ iii HMOX δβ +−>                       
and Y , otherwise.  0=i
For the possible endogeneity that the unobservable characteristics in Equation (3.1) 
are correlated with the determinants of a binary explanatory variable, which is HMOi in 
this analysis, Vella (1993) suggests a two-step procedure to obtain consistent estimates.  
Let the latent variable denoted by  represent the indirect utility associated with 
insurance plan that an individual i has chosen (Daniel McFadden, 1980). The value of 
 depends on some individual-specific and plan-specific characteristics,  given 
as
*iH
*iH
iH
iZ
iiZ εγ +=*
*iH
. Then, the observed insurance choice indicator HMOi  is determined 
based on  as follows:  
(3.3)         if  and 1=iHMO 0* >iH 0=iHMO   if .                       0*≤iH
In (3.2) and (3.3), errors,  andiu iε , are assumed to be jointly normally distributed 
with zero means, variances , (normalized to 1) and covariance 2uσ 2εσ εσ u  expressed as  
.  In the first step procedure, I estimate the parameters from 
Equation (3.3) using the probit model, and obtain 
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I rewrite Equation (3.2) in terms of its conditional expectation  
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(3.4)   ),(),( iiiiiiii HMOXuEHMOXHMOXYE ++= δβ  if Y . 0* >i
Note that 0)(),( ≠= iiiii HMOuEHMOXuE  since  u  andi iε  are correlated.  Under 
the bivariate normality assumption, the conditional expectation of  conditional on the 
endogenous binary variable can be expressed as:   
iu
(3.5)   


Φ=−>== )(
)()()1( γ
γφσγε ε
i
i
uiiiii Z
ZZuEHMOuE  
and                          
(3.6)              


Φ−
−=−≤==
)(1
)()()0( γ
γφσγε ε
i
i
uiiiii Z
ZZuEHMOuE ,                          
where φ and  are the probability density function and the cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal distribution. Evaluated at the consistent probit estimates 
Φ
γˆ  of (3.3), the generalized residuals denoted as νˆ are given as:  
(3.7)     


Φ≡ )ˆ(
)ˆ(ˆ γ
γφν
i
i
Z
Z   if  1=iHMO              
and 
(3.8)     


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−≡
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i
i
Z
Z   if 0=iHMO .       
Using Equations (3.5)-(3.8), I rewrite Equation (3.4) as: 
(3.9)   νσδβ ε ˆ),( uiiiii HMOXHMOXYE ++=   if Y .                      0* >i
Then Equation (3.1) can be rewritten as  
(3.10)     Y .      iuiii eHMOX +++= νσδβ ε ˆ*
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where the error, e , can be assumed to be uncorrelated with i iε . The likelihood function 
for the censored regression model with endogeneity correction of Equation (3.10) can be 
derived as follows: 
(3.11) 
)0(
)0(
1
}ˆ{1)
ˆ
(
>
=
= 


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uiii
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u
uiin
i
HMOXYHMOXL σ
νσδβφσσ
νσδβ εε .  
The maximum likelihood estimation of Equation (3.11) produces the consistent 
estimate of δ , indicating the effect of  HMOi  on utilization. The coefficient of νˆ  would 
give evidence about the role of self-selection in health plan choice. 
III.   Data 
In this analysis, I use data from the 2000 wave of the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS). The U.S. Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) and 
the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) collect this nationally representative 
data to provide information on demographic characteristics, health status, health 
insurance coverage, employment status and earnings, and various measures of health 
care utilization and expenditures for the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population. 
I limit my focus on the privately insured non-elderly (aged 18-64) sample. 
Individuals with Medicare, Medicaid or other types of public insurance are eliminated 
because this study intends to understand the choice between HMO plans and non-HMO 
plans among individuals who make decisions in the private market for health insurance. 
The final sample includes individuals who are covered only by any private health 
insurance.19 If individuals are covered by a private health insurance supplementing 
Medicare coverage, they are excluded from the final sample (N=7,474). The rate of  
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TABLE 15--DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS  
(AGE 18-64, PRIVATELY INSURED) 
 Total HMO Not HMO 
Total 7474 4252 3222 
Percentage 100.0 56.9 43.1 
Age 
18-24 .100 .108* .091 
25-44 .473 .492* .449 
45-54 .263 .258* .271 
55-64 .163 .143* .190 
Race/Gender/Marital Status 
White .706 .650* .780 
Black .115 .131* .094 
Hispanic .419 .181* .106 
Male .473 .469 .478 
Married .688 .677* .704 
Employed   .884* .858 
Education 
Less than High School .149 .156* .140 
High School Graduates .477 .490* .459 
More than High School .374 .353* .401 
Poverty Status of Family Income 
Poor .026 .025 .028 
Near Poor .014 .016* .011 
Low .083 .088* .077 
Middle .341 .348* .331 
High .536 .523* .554 
Family size 
1 .123 .126 .119 
2 .282 .258* .314 
3 .205 .203 .207 
4+ .390 .413* .360 
Place of residence 
Urban (MSA) .801 .854* .730 
Northeast .171 .205* .127 
Midwest .251 .190* .332 
South .366 .323* .391 
West .222 .276* .150 
* indicates that the estimate is statistically different from the corresponding estimate for the  
          non-HMO sample. 
 
 
HMO enrollment is 56.9% (4,252 in my final sample). According to the MEPS 
description, the presence of gatekeepers is questioned only if an individual is previously 
reported as non-HMO members. Hence, it is not possible to identify the role of 
gatekeepers in the efficiency of utilization management in HMO plans.  
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TABLE 16--HEALTH STATUS  
(AGE 18-64, PRIVATELY INSURED) 
                 
 Total HMO Not HMO 
Perceived Health Status 
Excellent/Very Good/Good .931 .929 .934 
Fair/Poor .068 .071 .065 
Number of Conditions (ICD9codes) 
(Mean) 
3.03 2.92* 3.16 
Number of Conditions (ICD9codes) (%) 
0 16.2 16.4 15.9 
1-2 36.4 37.1 35.3 
3+ 47.5 46.5 48.8 
Priority List .315 .304* .330 
Functional Limitation 
IADL .005 .005 .006 
ADL .003  .004* .002 
Social Limitation .016   .014* .020 
Cognitive Limitation .009 .010 .007 
Unable to Do Activity .013 .012 .014 
Any Limitation .138   .132* .145 
Diagnosed Chronic Conditions 
Arthritis .011 .010 .012 
Asthma .041 .043 .038 
Back Problem .136  .127* .147 
Cancer .036   .033* .039 
Depression .133  .139* .125 
Diabetes .052 .052 .053 
Emphysema .049  .042* .059 
Gallbladder .010 .010 .009 
Hypertension .151 .151 .151 
Ischemic .027 .025 .030 
Health Risks/Attitudes 
Current Smoker .191 .190 .193 
Likely to Take Risks 2.13 2.14 2.12 
No Need for Health Insurance^ 1.44 1.45 1.42 
Insurance No Worth Of Cost^ 2.03   2.01* 2.06 
Overcome Illness without Medical Help^ 2.17   2.14* 2.20 
Receiving Routine Medical Care .705 .706 .703 
Overall Quality of Health Care 8.07  7.93* 8.25 
Presence of Gatekeeper   .247 
Out-of-Pocket Payment  
Amount      415.8      358.6* 491.4 
Ratio of Total Payment .339 .313* .373 
 ^ indicates that the measurement is the following;1 disagree strongly, 2 disagree somewhat,  
          3 uncertain, 4 agree somewhat, and 5 agree strongly.  
 
Descriptions and summary statistics for the characteristics of HMO enrollees and non-
HMO enrollees are presented in Tables 15-17.  
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A.   Demographic Characteristics 
Table 15 presents the demographic characteristics of HMO and non-HMO enrollees 
aged 18-64 who are covered by either type of health plan for all of 2000.20  Comparisons 
show that HMO enrollees are younger; a higher percentage of HMO members are 
between 18 and 44 years old, while a smaller percentage of them are above age 45.  A  
relatively smaller percentage of HMO members are white: 65% compared to 78% of 
non-HMO members. More blacks and hispanics are enrolled in HMO plans. HMO 
members are less educated; only 35.3% are more than high school educated, compared 
to 40.1% of non-HMO enrollees.  
People enrolled in HMO plans are likely to be from families with income ranging 
from near poor to middle. High income families are more likely to enroll in non-HMO 
plans. HMO members seem to come from very large families as they are more likely to 
be blacks and hispanics who tend to have more children than whites and live as extended 
families across generations.  
People enrolled in HMOs are more likely to live in urban areas and in the Northeast 
or West, while non-HMO members mostly live in the Midwest and the South. This may 
be due to the different penetration rate of HMOs across regions.  
B.   Health Status and Insurance 
Table 16 compares various measures of health status for HMO and non-HMO 
members in 2000.  These data show little evidence that individuals enrolled in HMOs are 
relatively healthier than those in non-HMO plans. Self-rated health status, various 
measures of physical limitations, and diagnosed diseases are similar for these two groups. 
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However, people with certain chronic conditions are slightly less likely to enroll in 
HMOs than in non-HMOs. HMO members have a smaller number of conditions 
(ICD9codes21) and are less likely to suffer from a disease categorized in the priority 
list.22 The percentage of enrollees with back problem, cancer, and emphysema is lower 
among those in HMOs, while HMO members are more likely to have ADL and 
depression compared with non-HMO members. For those with only HMO coverage all 
year, 3.3 percent have cancer compared with 3.9 percent of those with non-HMO 
coverage all year. The rates for emphysema are 4.2 percent compared to 5.9 percent. 
Although these differences are statistically significant, they are not sizable enough to 
represent risk segmentation based on health risk. There are no differences in the 
percentage of HMO or non-HMO enrollees with arthritis, asthma, diabetes, gall bladder, 
hypertension, and ischemic heart diseases.  
Health risks and attitudes, such as being a current smoker and being likely to take 
risks are examined. There are no statistically significant differences with respect to their 
risk-taking behaviors. Regarding the attitudes towards health insurance and quality of 
health care, HMO members are more likely to appreciate their health insurance and 
medical care; they believe more strongly that health insurance is worth to the cost and 
that medical help is needed to overcome any illness. However, the evaluation of overall 
quality of health care is statistically significantly smaller among HMO members than 
non-HMO members, hinting at quality deterioration in HMO plans. 
HMO plans features lower cost sharing, creating financial incentives for enrollees to 
use more services than for people with non-HMO insurance, all else equal. The last two  
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TABLE 17--UTILIZATION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES  
    (AGE 18-64, PRIVATELY INSURED) 
Utilization 
 Total HMO Not HMO 
 Zero 
(%) 
Nonzero Zero 
(%) 
Nonzero Zero 
(%) 
Nonzero 
Office-Based Visits 26.8 6.34 27.4 6.17* 26.0 6.57 
Hospital Outpatient Visits 85.4 2.58 87.1   2.73 83.3 2.41 
Cost of Utilization: Out-of-Pocket Expenditure 
Office-Based .257 .210* .318 Rate of Cost Sharing 
Hospital 
Outpatient  
.123 .083* .210 
Office-Based 26.8 18.3* 37.7 Out-of-Pocket Unit 
Price of Service  
(In Dollars) 
Hospital 
Outpatient  
54.8 30.5* 79.7 
                    aThe rate of cost sharing is obtained as total annual out-of-pocket payments for the service   
      divided by total annual medical expenditures. The out-of-pocket unit price of service is defined as total  
      annual amount of out-of-pocket payments for the use of a type of service divided by total number of  
      visits to that service.  
 
 
rows in Table 17 show that the annual average amount of out-of-pocket payment per 
person and its ratio to total health care payment are both lower for HMO enrollees. As 
suggested in Tu, Kemper, and Wong (1999), this implies that HMOs may increase the 
use of medical care among enrollees. As far as health conditions not being significantly 
different between HMO and non-HMO members and HMO members being from  
families with less than high income level, the possible segmentation via insurance choice 
may occur based on the financial risk each individual is willing to hold.  
C.   Utilization of Health Care Services 
I consider two kinds of health services: office-based visits and hospital outpatient 
visits. Table 17 documents the pattern of utilization by HMO members and non-HMO 
members. A higher percentage of HMO members tend to make no use of office-based 
services and outpatient services. However, the average number of visits is statistically 
significantly smaller for HMO members only for office-based visits. Importantly, the 
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frequency of zero observations for both measures of utilization ranges from 26% to 87%, 
indicating that caution is needed when estimating the utilization function because it is 
not suitable to assume that this kind of measure of utilization follows a normal 
distribution with no probability hike at zero.  
Evidently, the financial incentive for consumers is well provided in HMOs. The 
ratio of total out-of-pocket payments to total medical expenditures is substantially higher 
for non-HMO members. The amount of out-of-pocket payment an individual pays on 
average per visit would more than double if not covered by HMOs. This implies that for 
costly services, HMO members may have an incentive to increase utilization (Tu, 
Kemper, and Wong, 1999). 
IV.   Estimation Results 
A.   Insurance Choice 
To examine the independent marginal effect of the characteristics presented in 
Tables 15 and 16 on insurance plan choice, a probit regression is estimated. As shown in 
Table 18, many of the characteristics that are important in describing enrollment 
differences in Tables 15 and 16 remain important in the marginal effect analysis. For 
example, younger individuals prefer HMOs. Blacks and hispanics are more likely to be 
HMO members compared to whites and other ethnic groups. HMO members are more 
likely to be employed and less likely to be more than high school educated. Regional and 
MSA status also remains important in explaining the choice of health plan among non-
elderly adults. People in the Northeast and West areas are more likely to enroll in HMOs, 
supporting the view that HMO enrollment rate is associated with geographical variations  
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TABLE 18--PROBIT ESTIMATION OF BINARY HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN CHOICE  
Variable Coefficient Std. Dev. Marginal Effect 
Constant .530 .211  
Age -.005 .002         -.0019** 
Black .232 .072          .0893*** 
Hispanic .164 .067          .0638** 
Male -.032 .044         -.0127 
Married -.041 .052         -.0161 
Employed .202 .060          .0799*** 
Less than High School  -.083 .066         -.0328 
More than High School  -.140 .044         -.0552*** 
Family Income .014 .025          .0069 
Family Size .018 .017          .0053 
Urban .302 .050          .1197*** 
Northeast .398 .059          .1509*** 
Midwest -.210 .050         -.0829*** 
West .454 .057          .1720*** 
Fair/Poor Health Status .059 .079          .0231 
Number of Conditions (ICD9codes) -.029 .008         -.0113*** 
Priority List -.021 .046         -.0082 
Diagnosed Chronic Conditions 
Arthritis .177 .174          .0695 
Asthma .104 .090          .0409 
Cancer .055 .091          .0218 
Depression .114 .052          .0447** 
Diabetes -.132 .083         -.0520 
Emphysema -.098 .080         -.0387 
Gall Bladder .027 .166          .0108 
Hypertension .137 .057          .0539** 
Ischemic .035 .101          .0136 
Health Risks/Attitudes 
Current Smoker .030 .053          .0119 
Likely to Take Risks .003 .018          .0011 
No Need for Health Insurance .057 .028          .0226** 
Insurance No Worth of Cost -.018 .018         -.0070 
Overcome Illness without Medical Help -.057 .018         -.0226*** 
Receiving Routine Medical Care .058 .066          .0229*** 
Overall Quality of Health Care -.056 .012         -.0222*** 
Out-of-Pocket Payment/Total Payment -.532 .080         -.2093*** 
Log-Likelihood  -2790.4 
 
 
of the penetration rate based on region-specific conditions.23  Lower cost sharing makes 
people enroll in HMOs, implying a possible increase in the use of health care service due 
to this financial incentive for consumers. The negative significant effect of overall rating 
on health care suggests a negative correlation between HMO enrollment and customer  
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TABLE 19--CENSORED REGRESSION OF UTILIZATION: OFFICE-BASED SERVICES 
Variable Uncorrected CMLE Corrected CMLE   
 Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. 
HMO Enrollment -.076 .314       17.2*** 2.87 
νˆ  (Endogeneity Correction) - -      -10.7*** 1.77 
Constant -.855 1.58     -10.5*** 2.33 
Age -.014 .016  .015 .017 
Black   -1.04* .542      -2.60*** .610 
Hispanic      -.683 .496      -1.64*** .535 
Male -.587* .331 -.320 .333 
Married      -.155 .392 -.022 .396 
Employed      -.261 .454       -1.60*** .509 
Less than High School  .779 .501 -.092 .513 
More than High School  .362 .333        1.28*** .367 
Family Income .011 .187 -.120 .189 
Family Size .076 .126 -.010 .128 
Urban .562 .386       -1.51*** .518 
Northeast       1.35*** .447     -1.42** .643 
Midwest .546 .390         1.81*** .444 
West      -.013 .434       -2.99*** .660 
Fair/Poor Health Status     1.44** .575     1.04* .579 
Number of Conditions (ICD9codes)     1.42*** .062         1.54*** 
Priority List       .238 .351   .443 .353 
Any Limitation     2.44*** .431        2.57*** .431 
Diagnosed Chronic Conditions 
Arthritis      -1.54 1.32 -2.57* 1.33 
Asthma     -2.15*** .673     -2.70*** .679 
Cancer .974 .691 .355 .694 
Depression  .635* .387 .052 .401 
Diabetes      -.252 .624  .461 .637 
Emphysema -1.17* .608 -.495 .625 
Gall Bladder      -1.26 1.22 -1.37 1.26 
Hypertension     -1.20*** .437      -2.17*** .458 
Ischemic      -1.15 .773  -1.46* .770 
Health Risks/Attitudes 
Current Smoker      -.209 .601 -.331 .606 
Advised to Quit Smoking      -.802 .733 -.961 .737 
Likely to Take Risks .040 .137  .032 .137 
No Need for Health Insurance -.345* .203      -.561*** .207 
Overcome Illness without Medical 
Help 
-.257* .138 .121 .153 
Receiving Routine Medical Care      2.03*** .504       1.45*** .514 
Overall Quality of Health Care .012 .087       .343*** .103 
Out-of-Pocket Payment/Total 
Payment 
    
Log-Likelihood  -15537.1 -15366.5 
.067 
 
satisfaction. Self-perceived health status and risk-taking behaviors remain insignificant. 
In contrast to Tables 15 and 16, marital status, family size, and family income as poverty 
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level lose their significance in affecting health plan choice. In addition, the presence of a 
condition in the priority list and some chronic problems such as cancer and emphysema 
are no longer statistically significant. 
On the other hand, as people agree more strongly with the statement that they do 
not need health insurance, they are more likely to enroll HMOs. However, HMO 
members are likely to feel more need for medical care to overcome illness. These results 
show that HMO enrollees are less willing to purchase health insurance but potentially 
more dependent on health care upon the occurrence of any sickness. People with certain 
chronic conditions such as depression and hypertension are more likely to be HMO 
members.24  
B.   Health Care Services 
Tables 19, 20, and A7 present estimation results of alternative specifications on  
health care utilization functions. As discussed in Section 3, the potential endogeneity of  
health plan choice and the non-negativity associated with excess zero events of the 
dependent variable are of particular concern. For this reason, six sets of results are 
presented: (1) OLS results of level linear model accounting for neither endogeneity nor 
non-negativity; (2) OLS results of level linear model associated with Vella’s correction 
accounting only for endogeneity; (3) OLS results of log-linear model accounting only 
for non-negativity; (4) OLS results of log-linear model with Vella’s correction 
accounting only for endogeneity; (5) Censored MLE results without endogeneity 
correction; and (6) Censored MLE with endogeneity correction. In Tables 6 (office- 
based visits) and 7 (hospital outpatient visits), I report results from (5) and (6).  
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TABLE 20--CENSORED REGRESSION OF UTILIZATION: HOSPITAL OUTPATIENT SERVICES 
Variable Uncorrected CMLE Corrected CMLE   
 Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. 
HMO Enrollment       -.395 .282  29.4*** 2.95 
νˆ (Endogeneity Correction) - - -18.4*** 1.82 
Constant  -8.70*** 1.49 -26.8*** 2.41 
Age  .065*** .015  .125*** .016 
Black      -.455 .525 -3.28*** .602 
Hispanic       .396 .461 -1.53*** .502 
Male      -.774** .307         -.486 .309 
Married       .562 .367 .818** .372 
Employed      -.585 .389 -2.92*** .455 
Less than High School        .121 .452 .933** .465 
More than High School       -.306 .302  1.33*** .343 
Family Income      -.173 .171         -.348** .173 
Family Size      -.161 .122 -.340*** .124 
Urban      -.719** .337 -4.24*** .487 
Northeast  1.86*** .404 -2.86*** .615 
Midwest  1.76*** .348  4.05*** .422 
West      -.144 .412 -5.23*** .653 
Fair/Poor Health Status       .541 .474        -.013 .478 
Number of Conditions (ICD9codes)       .562** .051 .837*** .059 
Priority List       .250 .309         .532* .311 
Any Limitation        .480 .367         .662* .368 
Diagnosed Chronic Conditions 
Arthritis  2.39*** .925          .619 .926 
Asthma      -.495 .542 -1.39*** .544 
Cancer  2.14*** .527 1.15** .529 
Depression      -.272 .323 -1.40*** .344 
Diabetes      -.737 .530          .580 .546 
Emphysema      -.889* .512          .127 .535 
Gall Bladder       2.20** .909          2.00** .922 
Hypertension      -.619* .373 -2.12*** .403 
Ischemic        .701 .599          .257 .593 
Health Risks/Attitudes 
Current Smoker      -1.22** .594         -1.52** .598 
Advised to Quit Smoking         1.38** .698          1.11 .703 
Likely to Take Risks       -.057 .125         -.106 .126 
No Need for Health Insurance       -.279 .200         -.698*** .206 
Overcome Illness without Medical 
Help 
      -.084 .127           .611*** .146 
Receiving Routine Medical Care        .552 .497         -.165 .507 
Overall Quality of Health Care       -.081 .078   .499*** .097 
Out-of-Pocket Payment/Total 
Payment 
    
Log-Likelihood  -4161.3 -4061.2 
 
Table A7 presents all other results from (1) to (4) for comparison.25 
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C.   Office-Based Visits 
As shown in Table 18, the coefficient of the HMO enrollment dummy variable is  
positive and highly significant only when correcting for self-selection. HMOs, which are  
usually seen as having strong restrictions on utilization, in fact encourage the use of 
office-based health care services. The negative and highly significant coefficient of the 
endogeneity correction term, νˆ , can be interpreted as  the fact that the unobserved 
factors that increase the probability of being enrolled in an HMO lead to lower 
utilization relative to that of the randomly assigned HMO enrollees. This means that 
self-selection in health plan choice occurs in a favorable way for HMO plans. 
Considering the finding that HMO enrollment is not significantly affected by various 
health conditions, I suggest that the introduction of HMO plans does not succeed in 
revealing hidden health care needs and sorting populations into different plans 
accordingly. 
If a person is employed, she uses less medical services as her employment status 
indicates whether her health condition is good enough for her to afford to work. People 
of more than high school education are likely to use more health care services. This is 
well documented in the literature showing that the more educated, the more they are 
concerned with their health because longer working life expectancy is important for 
them to compensate the opportunity cost they have paid for additional years in education.  
Racial minorities such as blacks and hispanics tend to depend less on office-based visits. 
This suggests that cultural differences or health care disparity from the provider side 
across ethnicity may be an important factor in determining utilization patterns. In regions 
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where the higher percentage of HMO enrollees dwell (Table 15), utilization is relatively 
lower; the MSA, the Northeast, and the West show lower utilization. Notably, age and 
income are not generally significant. My sample consists of individuals with private 
health insurance coverage. Therefore, out of pocket payments for health care services are 
relatively small as a fraction of total expenditures and thus utilization is not elastic to 
income level.  
While perceived health condition worse than good, number of conditions, and 
having any limitation in activity or a medical condition listed as priority lead to more 
utilization, some chronic diseases have negative effects on utilization; as each type of 
disease requires different procedures and treatments in a specific way, having one kind 
of disease does not mean necessarily higher utilization of one specific type of health 
service. Visits to office-based health providers are affected by attitudes regarding health 
insurance; if a person believes more strongly that she needs a health insurance, she is 
likely to use more services. She may believe so since she expects some future occurrence 
of her health condition, which will requires the financial establishment to pay for it. Also 
not surprisingly, having routine medical check-ups and higher rating on overall quality 
of health care have significantly positive effects on the level of utilization. 
D.   Hospital Outpatient Visits 
Similar to the case of office-based service, HMO enrollment increases the use of 
services, and self-selection is positive for HMOs. Interestingly, age, and family income 
and size become statistically significant, giving intuitively probable signs: older people 
visit the hospital more often as outpatients. People from larger families and lower-
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income families seem to make a smaller number of visits. These findings can be 
explained by the relatively higher per-visit price of hospital outpatient services relative 
to office-based care, which should be financed from consumers’ own resources; as 
shown in Table 4, among non-HMO members, the self-financed amount of per-visit to 
hospital outpatient services is on average $79.7, which is much higher than the $37.7 
per-visit to office-based services. For HMO members, these amounts are $30.5 and 
$18.3, respectively. As the cost sharing portion of total payments is more burdensome on 
consumers, family size and family income constrain the use of hospital outpatient 
services. In the case of relatively cheap office-based services, these family budget 
constraints may not restrict utilization in a significant way. Similarly, only a person who 
manages to accumulate some resources over time can afford to make a relatively 
expensive visit to the hospital. 
V.   Conclusion 
In this study, I use the censored MLE method combined with endogeneity 
correction to jointly estimate the choice of health insurance plans and health care 
utilization respecting the possibility of self-selection into insurance plans, and the non-
negativity and high frequency of zero events in utilization. I find significant evidence of 
favorable selection into HMOs; individuals who are more likely to enroll in HMOs are 
likely to utilize less health care services. HMO enrollees are younger but not particularly 
healthier than enrollees in non-HMO plans. Often the younger age distribution among 
HMO members is explained as meaning that HMOs are preferred by people who expect 
to have children because HMOs have lower out-of-pocket costs for maternity benefits 
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and pediatric care for children (Taylor, Beauregard, and Vistnes, 1995). Then, the 
favorable self-selection in health plan choice does not depend on health risk but on 
financial risk, which is consistent with the finding that HMO enrollment is encouraged 
by the lower relative burden of cost sharing. Since younger people tend to be more 
optimistic regarding their health condition and more favorably disposed toward risk-
taking when purchasing an insurance plan, they may lean toward an HMO plan 
regardless of its restrictions on access to services and choice of providers. The 
arrangement of consumer incentives such as premium, coinsurance rate, and out-of-
pocket payments may be more important than the health status of the population in 
determining their choice of plans.  
HMOs encourage the use of office-based and hospital outpatient health services and 
receive lower evaluation on overall quality of health care. Thus, I conclude that HMOs 
are not effective in modifying health care use behavior and seem to fail in managing 
quality and utilization in any significant way.   
In sum, this study suggests that demographic and health related factors are less 
important than generally expected in health insurance choice and utilization of health 
services. Instead, choice of health plans among individuals appears to depend on 
financial incentives for consumers. Similarly, the cost effectiveness in terms of 
utilization performance in a type of health plan may rely on its style of medical care 
delivery management, such as, provider-side incentive, reimbursement arrangement, and 
utilization review as well as demand for health care services among consumers. This 
implies that more investigation of the relationship between health care management 
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mechanisms and the use of health care services should be conducted to determine which 
factor is indeed responsible for the success or failure of HMO plans in saving costs. As 
HMO plans are notorious for their tight utilization control for consumers, the source of 
cost-saving effects in HMOs may be found in looking at health care provider behaviors. 
It is possible that providers, not consumers, have an incentive to provide an excessive 
amount of care or unnecessarily expensive care for their own financial benefit upon a 
contracted reimbursement mechanism.  
An important subject for future empirical work is to implement utilization 
estimation using a discrete distributional assumption rather than a continuous normal 
distribution. One modified count model, called the zero-inflated count model (John 
Mullahy, 1986) is an alternative; by allowing different data generating process for zero 
observation and nonzero observations, this model explicitly deals with the feature of 
excess zero events in a count variable assuming a negative binomial distribution. The 
limitation of this model is concerned with accounting for endogenous regressors. Some 
econometricians attempt to incorporate the possible self-selection and the zero-inflated 
count variable, but usually rely on computationally intensive methods and additional 
specification assumptions to have convergence. Results of any further research on the 
role of HMO plans in the private insurance market would be relevant to the question of 
whether the introduction of HMO plans to Medicare and Medicaid is likely to have 
much of a cost saving impact as supposed and so will pull down the rising trend of 
government medical expenditures. Much more analysis of these patterns is required 
before any policy implications can be drawn.  
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY 
In Chapter II, I conducted a panel analysis to examine the joint decisions of young 
female college graduates regarding their occupational choices and labor force 
participation. Due to the advantage of panel estimations, all results are supposed to be 
robust without any bias from unobserved heterogeneity. I found that contrary to common 
belief, the presence of a new-born baby does not substantially increase the probability of 
females being teachers. Rather, college major in education is the most important factor 
for being teachers, suggesting that the choice of teaching as a career is predetermined 
during college years, not made after finishing education. However, teachers are more 
likely to exit the labor force as well as to quit the job when they have a new-born baby, 
compared to nonteachers. This supports Polachek (1982) in that the teaching profession 
is relatively favorable for temporary leave; female teachers may return to the job with 
little wage loss after they leave for maternity.  
Relative wages appear to lead females to the teaching profession. This implies that 
the recent policy to increase wages for teachers may succeed in attracting more teachers, 
and possibly better teachers.  
Chapter III focused on the relationship between entry wages and post wages, which 
depend on a worker’s adjustment in hours of work responding to a random shock in 
wages. I found empirical evidence that entry wages are positively correlated with post 
wages until 21 years since the year of starting to work. If a worker is lucky at the 
beginning (the positive random shock in her entry wage), she will receive higher wages 
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in the later period of her career. This suggests that the recent increase in wage 
differentials may be contributed by the persistent effect of the randomness in entry 
wages.  
Results in Chapter IV are more sophisticated in their interpretation due to the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, which are not explicitly addressed. 
Both in the descriptive comparison and estimation of marginal effects, health conditions 
are not particularly important in the choice of health insurance plans, HMOs versus non-
HMOs. However, in the utilization analysis, I found strong evidence of favorable self-
selection for HMOs, implying that the HMO enrollees are those who potentially use less 
health care services.  
When self-selection is corrected properly, HMO members are likely to use more 
medical services. This suggests that the tight utilization review in HMOs is not tight 
enough to reduce the use of health care services. Instead, the consumer incentive of low 
cost sharing seems to cause the moral hazard problem in the demand for health care 
services. Cost savings in HMOs may be found on the provider-side incentive in 
reimbursement arrangements so that providers control the supply of health care services 
just to meet the necessity. Though people purchase health insurance as a shield against 
future hazard in health conditions, they choose the plan with more weight on the 
financial aspect and less weight on health conditions. Therefore, policy reform in health 
care should be made to assure the affordability of insurance and health care services.   
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ENDNOTES 
1   Across the literature, different measures for fertility and labor supply are used to find this negative  
correlation (Martin Browning, 1994).  Any measure of ‘fertility’ is found to be negatively correlated with 
any measure of female labor supply. Common measures of fertility are the presence of a new-born child, 
the number of children under age 6, number of children under age 16, total number of children in the 
household, and number of children ever born. Labor supply measures are usually labor force participation 
or hours worked. 
 
2   Nonteachers suffer a 9.5% of wage loss per year out of the labor force. 
3   Dolton and Makepeace (1993) use the U.K. college graduates cohort data. 
4   For teachers, a participation decision is observed only if teaching is chosen. 
5   The labor force participation equation for teachers uses the sample of females whose current/last 
occupation is teaching. The nonteachers group include females whose current/last occupation is other than 
teaching.  
 
6   Stinebrickner (2002) shows that contrary to common beliefs, teachers leave their job to stay at home 
and do not find other occupations. The presence of a new-born baby is suggested as the main reason of this 
attrition behavior.  
 
7   This result is consistent with the findings of Dolton and Makepeace (1993). However, they focus on 
how responsive the probability for college graduate cohorts of becoming teachers is to relative wages.  
 
8   For example, the labor force participation information on a female is included in the teacher’s group 
estimation if she is currently or was most recently teaching in the same year when participation status is 
reported. In another survey year when she is not teaching, then her labor force participation status is 
included in the nonteachers’ group estimation. 
 
9   Though Dolton and Makepeace (1996) followed the same variable definitions, this approach is 
problematic. In particular, it is more reasonable to consider that a worker’s labor market status is 
categorized into three possible cases: non labor force participation, participation as teacher, and 
participation as nonteachers. Then, rather than a binary choice model, a unordered multiple choice model 
is preferred. Since the panel estimation of multinomial logit or probit model is computationally intensive, I 
leave it to further research. A multinomial choice model for investigating teacher-nonteacher comparison 
in labor market behaviors would be interesting even in a cross-sectional analysis.   
 
10   NLS-Young Women data heavy attrition rates, which may result in nonrandom sampling problems. 
When using unbalanced panel sample, the estimation results (not reported here, available upon request) 
and main conclusions do not change.  
 
11   The wave interval is irregular. The survey years are 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 85, 
87, and 88. The next wave is 1991. Since 1991, the survey has been conducted biannually and has 
included questions about health condition, history of marriage or labor market activity, and social security 
and pension. 
 
12   When restricted to females with at least 16 years of education, the sample becomes small relative to the 
original sample size: 5,159. This is partly because of the high attrition rate of the NLS-Young Women 
data, reducing the sample to 2,712 for the balanced panel. The other reason is to make occupational 
subsamples comparable in their characteristics. Since all teachers in my sample except a few have at least 
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16 years of education, by removing high school only educated nonteachers, the remaining sample consists 
of college educated females who are eligible to become teachers and free to choose other jobs. One 
concern is that many females with no teaching experience are only high school or less educated. This 
implies that the selection to higher education may be strong among the nonteachers group.  
 
13   For this comparison, I define teachers as those who have ever reported their occupation as teaching in 
elementary or secondary schools. Since occupation can vary over time within an individual, in the 
switching model estimation, I regard teachers as those who have their current/last job in teaching in any 
survey year. 
 
14   Age effects remain consistent with Table 5. 
15   The largest effect is attributed to college major in education in Tables 7 and 8. In the switching model, 
the effect of relative log wage is indeed the largest among all other explanatory variables including college 
major in education. All discussions about results in Table 8 are valid for results in the switching model 
reported in Table 8 as well.  
 
16   The panel logit estimations both in the fixed effects and in the random effects are implemented. The 
results are mostly consistent with the findings from the probit estimation reported here, but weak in 
significance.  
 
17   Among these 752 individuals, I only consider those who have started to work no later than 1985. Then 
we are left with 716 individuals. All 36 individuals excluded from my final sample are high school 
graduates or less than high school educated. Unless some kind of interruption in schooling happens, these 
individuals are supposed to finish all schooling by age 18. If they have not started to work by 1985 (age 
20-27), it implies that they spend 2-9 years without working. By restricting my sample to those who 
started working by 1985, I allow only limited years of job searching or after school training after finishing 
all education. In this way, I may exclude a possible discontinuous career effect on estimation results. 
 
18   The remaining results of the entry wage estimation are in Table A3. Post wage estimations are briefly 
reported in Table A4. In Table A5, results from different specification of initial wage estimations are 
presented. In short, the results are consistently similar to Table 13.  
 
19   I exclude individuals who have multiple coverage as the combination of private and public insurance 
because their utilization of health care services is reported as a total annual amount so that it is difficult to 
sort out what portion of the total annual number of visits to specific health services are associated with 
their coverage and choice of a private insurance plan. For a similar reason, being ‘privately insured’ is 
defined as being insured by any private insurance throughout the entire year 2000. Individuals may change 
their coverage status and insurance plan at any point within year. Hence, based on the monthly insurance 
status information, I figure the sample with only private insurance for every month in the year 2000.  
 
20   I concentrate on the results for persons enrolled only in HMO and non-HMO plans for the entire 
calendar year. MEPS 2000 provides the enrollment status at three different points during a year. Based on 
this information, HMO enrollment in my analysis means that a person is reported to be enrolled in HMO 
plans throughout a year. Because a person may enroll in both types of plans by switching plans at some 
point during the year, any conclusions drawn from these statistics would be less meaningful and perhaps 
misleading.  
 
21   The number of condition variables is measured as how many medical problems are held by an 
individual based on ICD9codes. The list of ICD9codes is the ninth version of the International 
Classification of Diseases, a standardized list of 3 digits codes to identify a specific medical condition. 
This list is maintained by the National Center for Health Statistics and the Health Care Financing 
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Administration. The entire list of ICD9codes is provided as Appendix 2 to the documentation for the 
Medical Condition component of MEPS 2000. 
22   A priority list is constructed based on each condition’s prevalence, importance in expense, and 
relevance to policy. The complete listing of priority conditions is provided by MEPS 2000 (the same 
documentation as above, Appendix 4). This list is categorized into three groups; long-term life-threatening 
conditions such as cancer, diabetes, emphysema, hypertension, and ischemic heart disease; chronic 
manageable conditions including arthritis, asthma, and gall bladder disease; in addition, some mental 
health issues such as depression are included.  
 
23   Health, United States 2003 reports the percent of population enrolled in HMOs by geographical region 
in year 2000; Northeast 36.5%, Midwest 23.2%, South 22.6%, West 41.7%. However, the number of 
HMO plans available in a region shows the opposite pattern; Northeast 98, Midwest 161, South 203, West 
106. These data shows that the extent of popularity of HMO plans varies across regions reflecting regional 
variations in adopting new administrative health care systems and in need of managing quality and 
utilization. 
 
24   To avoid potential bias to include individuals who do not have a choice as to whether to join an HMO, 
I replicate the regression analysis using a more limited sample, restricting the population to those who 
have choices in selecting their health care plan. This reduces the sample size from 7,474 to 2,428. The 
results reported in Table A6 do not change the earlier conclusions. Many variables remain statistically 
significant except for age, being black, being employed, and having depression as a chronic condition. 
 
25   Estimates of HMO effect in utilization are all insignificant and change signs across specifications and 
dependent variables. However, when the potential self-selection is controlled, the endogeneity correction 
term captures the negative correlation between utilization of health care services and the unobserved 
factors that determine the choice of a plan. Also, HMO enrollment has a positive and highly significant 
effect on utilization; a result consistent with the CMLE cases. It is also clear that accounting for the non-
negativity of the dependent variable and selection bias from the endogenous explanatory variable is 
important. This is illustrated by changes in the sum of squared residuals (SSR); the non-negativity 
correction reduces the SSR considerably and the additional endogeneity correction leads to even more 
reduction in the SSR. Though the main results appear to be similar to results from the CMLE regression, 
the test for normality on the dependent variable and estimated residual rejects the normal distribution 
assumption. Hence, I focus on discussing the results obtained from the CMLE model, which account for 
non-negativity as well as endogeneity without losing observations as it would be the case when taking logs 
for the dependent variables. The other explanatory variables in four sets of OLS specifications which are 
not discussed in detail show similar effects in signs and statistical significance to the CMLE results 
presented in Table 20. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1--EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND BY OCCUPATION 
(PANEL A) HIGHEST YEARS OF EDUCATION ATTAINMENT 
Highest Education 
Attainment (Years) 
Have Been Teachers Have Never Been Teachers 
 Overall (%) Between (%) Overall (%) Between (%) 
16 53.59 38.56 64.51 57.19 
17 20.02 24.18 18.02 19.73 
18 26.40 37.25 17.47 23.08 
Mean 16.73 16.53 
N(n) 2383  (306) 2192  (299) 
 
(PANEL B) COLLEGE MAJOR 
Major Have Been Teachers Have Never Been Teachers 
Education          50.00                10.37 
Business              .98                12.04 
Social Science          10.13                18.39 
Health, Medical 
Science 
             .65                14.72 
Other          38.24                44.48 
n        306              299 
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TABLE A2--SAMPLE COMPOSITION BY YEAR OF STARTING WORK 
Year of Starting Work Years Since 
Initial Work 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 Sample Size 
1 451 68 19 6 6 9 4 563 
2 438 60 18 6 8 9 6 545 
3 421 60 19 6 9 9 8 532 
4 407 61 20 9 9 10 7 523 
5 421 58 17 5 6 10 6 523 
6 411 65 19 7 4 9 6 521 
7 428 69 23 6 3 9 7 545 
8 433 63 20 5 3 11 6 541 
9 419 64 21 7 3 11 6 531 
10 417 70 24 7 4 9 7 538 
11 427 66 22 6 6 10 7 544 
12 406 68 25 8 5 12 7 531 
13 409 67 25 8 5 13 0 527 
14 423 67 25 8 4 0 0 527 
15 438 66 27 10 0 0 0 541 
17 450 76 29 0 0 0 0 555 
19 466 71 0 0 0 0 0 537 
21 476 0 0 0 0 0 0 476 
        aThe sample size for x year since initial work with x ranging 1 to 21 corresponds to 
estimation results reported in Table 13. For estimation of x years since initial work, the dependent 
variables is a post wage at x + year of starting to work. For example, wages in 1982 for workers 
who have started to work in 1979 and wages in 1983 for workers who have started to work in 
1980 and so on are used in the estimation for 3 years since initial work in Table 13. 
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TABLE A3--ENTRY WAGE REGRESSION 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Coefficient t-Ratio Std. Dev. Coefficient t-Ratio Std. Dev. 
Constant    4.293***  17.41 .2465    2.974***   4.57 .6502 
Age      .048***    4.02 .0120      .051***    4.22 .0120 
Education       .011      .78 .0137      .278**   2.16 .1288 
Education2        - .013**  -2.00 .0067 
AFQT       .002***    3.25 .0007    - .005   - .66 .0079 
AFQT* Education     - .0007      .98 .0007 
White    - .033    - .68 .0482    - .031   - .64 .0481 
Male     .256***    8.17 .0313      .249***    7.92 .0314 
Married   - .029*   - .79 .0369    - .032   - .87 .0368 
Start 79     .705***    5.51  .1278      .688***    5.39 .1278 
Start 80     .624***    4.75  .1313      .602***    4.58 .1314 
Start 81     .691***    4.88  .1415      .678***    4.80 .1413 
Start 82     .305*     1.81  .1684      .277    1.64 .1684 
Start 83     .393**    2.23   .1759      .407**    2.31 .1759 
Start 84     .365**    2.28 .1594      .345**    2.16 .1595 
No. Obs. 697 697 
Adjusted R2  .240 .244 
aStart 79-85 dummies for the year of starting to work between 1979 and 1985. 
bResult (1) is associated with Table 12. Result (2) is the first step estimation of initial wage associated 
with Table 13. 
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TABLE A4--POST WAGE REGRESSIONS (1980-1994, 1996, 1998, 2000) 
 Age Education AFQT White Male Married Exp Exp2 
1 -.035    .022 -.0005  .015 -.048  .040   
2 -.036    .013 . 0008  .028  .050  .032   .216***  
3 -.083***    .004 -.0009  .055 -.138  .068   .681**    -.109* 
4 -.036    .026  .0013 -.018  .129  .016   .194    -.001 
5 -.031    .055***  .0023 -.066  .188  .038   .132    -.005 
6  .005    .036*  .0019  .022  .277*  .080*  -.049     .017 
7  .007    .062***  .0034* -.036  .350**  .021   .024     .004 
8  .016    .092***  .0041**  .024  .409**  .013   .168**    -.008 
9  .014    .033  .0064** -.079  .361  .022    .142    -.007 
10 -.017    .053**  .0036 -.005  .251  .024  -.054     .007 
11  .002    .048***  .0028* -.006  .277*  .027   .086    -.001 
12  .006      .052**  .0022 -.032  .268  .080   .213***    -.008** 
13 -.011    .012  .0039 -.031  .123  .121*    .122    -.002 
14  .058 -.0008  .0045* -.037  .407*  .081   .048     .002 
15 -.022    .014  .0021  .030  .038  .022   .075*  -.0006 
17  .028    .071***  .0034  .019  .428** -.068   .017     .001 
19  .042    .073***  .0058*** -.006  .533*** -.005  -.020     .002 
21 -.027    .076***  .0040  .070  .189 -.001   .011   .0009 
aSince the NLSY1979 conducted the survey biannually since 1994, no information about 1995, 1997 and 
1999 wages are available. 
bAll of the regressors reported above are included in the regression along with the predicted initial wage, 
the estimated residual and dummies for each year of starting to work during 1979-1985. Table 2 only 
presents results of the predicted initial wage and the estimated residual. 
cStandard errors, t-ratios and results for the start-to-work year dummies are provided upon request. 
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TABLE A5--DECOMPOSITION OF ENTRY WAGE EFFECTS 
 Specification II Specification III 
Years Since 
Initial 
Work 
 
0wˆ (t-Ratio) 
 
0εˆ (t-Ratio) 
 
Adj. R2 
 
0wˆ (t-Ratio) 
 
0εˆ (t-Ratio) 
 
Adj. R2 
1   .561   (1.65)* .451   (11.36) .371     .842    (2.34)** .447   (11.25) .373 
2   .318   (.93) .495   (12.37) .415 .487    (1.37) .493   (12.31) .415 
3 .641    (1.39) .374   (6.81) .243  1.105   (2.29)** .369   (6.72) .246 
4 .560    (1.20) .213   (4.00) .230 .497    (.98) .212   (3.98) .229 
5 .241    (.59) .314   (6.18) .295 .015    (.03) .317   (6.22) .296 
6 -.228   (-.51) .417   (7.75) .317 -.270   (-.55) .419   (7.77) .317 
7 .356    (.77) .238   (4.85) .288 .069    (.14) .241   (4.88) .288 
8 .139    (.27) .209   (3.73) .243 -.500   (-.90) .220   (3.89) .246 
9 .365    (.71) .254   (4.52) .264 -.170   (-.30) .262   (4.61) .265 
10 .102    (.19) .259   (4.33) .231 .003    (.01) .260   (4.34) .231 
11 .153    (.35) .206   (4.21) .324 -.130   (-.27) .210   (4.27) .324 
12 .486    (1.04) .296   (5.41) .339 .256    (.46) .297   (5.42) .339 
13 .652    (1.07) .310   (3.98) .226 .351    (.49) .313   (3.99) .226 
14 .992    (1.52) .220   (3.06) .256 -.120    (-.18) .228   (3.16) .254 
15 .331    ( .63) .203   (3.53) .275 .309    (.54) .202   (3.52) .275 
17 .284    ( .55) .292   (4.95) .256 -.410   (-.75) .301   (5.08) .258 
19 .369    ( .74) .236   (3.96) .282 -.520   (-.95) .246   (4.15) .285 
21 -.164   (-.26) .227   (3.01) .198 -.340   (-.49) .229   (3.04) .199 
        aSpecification II: in the first step regression of initial wage, we include only family variables; father’s 
and mother’s educational attainment in 1979, the closest sibling’s gender and years of education in 1993. 
        bSpecification III: in the first step regression of initial wage, we include age, gender (dummy), marital 
status (dummy), race (dummy), education, education squared, AFQT score, an interaction term of 
education and AFQT score and starting-to-work year dummies as well as father’s and mother’s 
educational attainment in 1979, the closest sibling’s gender and years of education in 1993. 
       cAll estimated coefficients for 0εˆ are significant at 1% level. I omit *** for concision. 
       dResults not presented here are provided upon request. 
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TABLE A6--PROBIT ESTIMATION OF HMO ENROLLMENT DURING THE ENTIRE CALENDAR 
YEAR 2000 FOR THOSE HAVING A CHOICE OF PLANS 
Variable Coefficient    Std. Dev.   Marginal Effect 
Hispanic .237 .112          .0849** 
More than High School  -.210 .069         -.0784*** 
Urban .147 .088          .0559* 
Northeast .667 .101          .2201*** 
West .640 .092          .2169*** 
Number of Conditions (ICD9codes) -.032 .014         -.0120** 
Hypertension .157 .091          .0586* 
No Need for Health Insurance .097 .043          .0362** 
Overall Quality of Health Care -.082 .020         -.0306*** 
Out-of-Pocket Payment/Total Payment -.398 .135         -.1485*** 
Log-Likelihood  -1077.8 
aIn the regression, exactly same set of regressors are included. Variables reported in this table are  
those which have at least 10% level of statistical significance for concision. 
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TABLE A7--ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION OF ESTIMATING UTILIZATION                                        
OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
Panel 1                                                   Total office-based visits 
Variable Linear OLS Log-Linear OLS 
 Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
HMO Enrollment -.045 (.292) 12.9 (2.5)*** .007 (.028)  2.14 (.243)*** 
νˆ  (Endogeneity) - -8.03 (1.55)*** - -1.32 (.150)*** 
SSR 388615.3 384742.4 2972.0 2902.9 
Adjusted R2 .178 .178 .277 .291 
Panel 2                                           Total hospital outpatient visits  
Variable Linear OLS Log-Linear OLS 
 Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
HMO Enrollment .015 (.076)  3.39 (.657)*** -.021 (.049)  1.78 (.475)*** 
νˆ  (Endogeneity) - -2.09 (.405)*** - -1.13 (.295)*** 
SSR 26501.0 26297.2 451.6 442.9 
Adjusted R2 .056 .062 .095 .110 
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